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THE IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF KLEIN 
Howard M. Wasserman* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Law is steeped in myth.1  So, too, are many judicial decisions in the 
legal canon.2 
One such mythical decision is United States v. Klein.3  In that 
Reconstruction-era decision, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
congressional attempt to dictate the judicial and evidentiary effect of 
presidential pardons in Court of Claims actions brought by Southern 
property owners to recover proceeds on property confiscated by Union 
agents during the Civil War.4  Klein is canonical as much for its 
purported indeterminacy as for its principles of separation of powers.5  
 *  Associate Professor of Law, FIU College of Law.  Various versions of this paper were 
presented at faculty workshops at Florida State University College of Law in February 2010, FIU 
College of Law and Rutgers School of Law–Camden in March 2009, and at PrawfsFest! in November 
2008; thanks to all participants for their comments and suggestions.  Special thanks to Michael Allen, 
William Araiza, Elizabeth Foley, Todd Pettys, Martin Redish, Michael Solimine, Allan Stein, Amanda 
Tyler, William Van Alstyne, Steve Vladeck, and Gordon Young for comments and suggestions on 
research and early drafts. 
 1. See, e.g., Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008); 
Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987 (2003); Steven G. Gey, 
The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601 (2002); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); Todd E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 991 (2009); see also Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 972 
(2009) [hereinafter Bloom, Noble Lie]. 
 2. Scholars have described the “myth” of three other canonical cases: Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).  See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 
(1974); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003) 
[hereinafter Paulsen, Myth]; Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering 
Summary Judgment Burdens on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
81 (2006). 
 3. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). 
 4. Id. at 145–47.  See Evan Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 571–72 
(2005); Edward A. Hartnett, Congress Clears its Throat, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 553, 570–73 (2005); 
Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the 
Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 
437, 438 (2006); Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2525–26 (1998); 
Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulations of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Processes: United 
States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1192–94. 
 5. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (expressing uncertainty as to 
the “precise scope of Klein”); Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1096 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (“Klein’s exact meaning is far from clear.”); see also Sager, supra note 4, at 2525 (labeling 
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The case is of “substantial significance,” although “no one is exactly 
sure how or why.”6 
In fact, Klein is more relevant today than it has been in its 140-year 
history.7  In the past decade, Congress has considered, and occasionally 
enacted, laws that have at least triggered Klein-based separation of 
powers objections or arguments.  These laws broadly fall in three areas: 
(1) tort reform efforts to prohibit particular classes of state-law tort 
claims;8 (2) attempts to control so-called judicial activism, such as by 
overriding state court decisions on controversial issues9 or prohibiting 
federal-court use of foreign and international law in constitutional 
interpretation;10 and (3) laws enacted as part of the Global War on 
Terror, such as granting retroactive immunity to telecommunications 
providers who assisted the Bush Administration in arguably unlawful 
domestic wiretap operations11 or establishing adjudicative mechanisms 
for dealing with terror detainees.12  All of these laws, particularly those 
dealing with the War on Terror, return Klein and the limits it purportedly 
imposes on Congress and the executive to the center of the constitutional 
Klein as “deeply puzzling”). 
 6. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 437. 
 7. Two things demonstrate Klein’s rebirth in doctrinal prominence.  First, one Federal Courts 
casebook now gives Klein and its subsequent evolution substantial play.  See PETER W. LOW ET AL., 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL–STATE RELATIONS 103–13 (6th ed. Supp. 2009).  Other 
casebooks continue to give the case note status.  See, e.g., DONALD L. DOERNBERG ET AL., FEDERAL 
COURTS, FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2008); RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th 
ed. 2009); MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND 
QUESTIONS (6th ed. 2007).  Second, the new “Federal Courts Stories” book, telling the underlying 
stories of significant Federal Courts cases, includes a chapter on Klein.  Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of 
Klein: The Scope of Congress’ Authority to Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL 
COURTS STORIES (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2009). 
 8. See, e.g., Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 
(2005); City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 395–96 (2d Cir. 2008); Personal 
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong. (as passed in the House of 
Representatives); see also WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, 
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS 228 (2004) (coining term “third world of torts” to describe class-
action litigation to recover for mass-tort conduct causing latent injuries, labeling it a “harbinger of future 
development of social policy torts involving gun manufacturers [and] fast food producers”).  See infra 
notes 269–276 and accompanying text. 
 9. See An Act for the Relief of Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 
25 (2005). 
 10. See Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S.520, 109th Cong. § 201 (as introduced in the 
Senate) (prohibiting federal courts from considering foreign and international law in interpreting U.S. 
Constitution).  See infra notes 182–200 and accompanying text. 
 11. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
261, § 802, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2010)); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency 
Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956–57 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (upholding immunity 
provision as against Klein challenge). 
 12. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
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debate.13 
The problem is that Klein is a myth.  Actually, Klein is two related 
myths.  The first is the myth of meaninglessness—that Klein does not 
obviously stand for anything because no one knows what the case means 
or says.  To be sure, the opinion by Chief Justice Chase is “opaque,” 
“deeply puzzling,” “disjointed,” “delphic,” “generally difficult to 
follow,” and contains broad language and exaggerated rhetorical 
flourishes, with statements of principles that cannot literally be true and 
often are dead wrong.14  That perceived opacity lends Klein 
indeterminacy, an all-things-to-all-people quality.15  The result is a “cult 
of Klein,” a reverence that prompts parties and scholars to seize on the 
perceived lack of clarity to argue for broad Klein-derived limits on 
congressional control over federal law and courts.16  If Klein has no 
discernible meaning, there is at least a plausible argument that it applies 
to any objectionable situation. 
This leads to the second, more fundamental myth of vigor—the false 
belief that Klein is strong precedent imposing genuine, unique 
limitations that an overreaching Congress realistically might transgress 
and that a court might wield to invalidate congressional action.  
Consider that in almost 140 years, the only case to strike down a law 
explicitly on Klein grounds was Klein itself; every Klein-based 
challenge to federal legislation has, quite appropriately, failed.17  Klein 
 13. I consider the effect of Klein on War on Terror legislation in the follow-up to this Article.  
See Howard M. Wasserman, Constitutional Pathology, the War on Terror, and United States v. Klein, 5 
J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2011). 
 14. See William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of 
Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 
1055, 1074 (1999); Frederic M. Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1679, 1718 (2005) 
[hereinafter Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses]; Hartnett, supra note 4, at 572; Barry Friedman, The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1, 
34 (2002) (“Klein is sufficiently impenetrable that calling it opaque is a compliment”); Daniel J. 
Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2549 (1998) (“Much that it 
said in the opinion is exaggerated if not dead wrong . . . .”); Sager, supra note 4, at 2525 (arguing that, 
while not exactly Fermat’s Last Theorem, Klein is “deeply puzzling”); Young, supra note 4, at 1193, 
1195 (describing opinion as “confusing” and criticizing “excessively broad and ambiguous statements” 
in majority opinion); id. at 1212 (labeling opinion “disjointed, ambiguous, and generally difficult to 
follow”). 
 15. See Young, supra note 4, at 1195. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995); Robertson v. Seattle 
Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 439–41 (1992); Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F. 3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir. 
2009); City of New York v. Beretta Corp. U.S.A., 524 F.3d 384, 396 (2d Cir. 2008); Ecology Ctr. v. 
Castaneda, 426 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2005); Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 
1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2001); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig, 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 
961–64 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also Caminker, supra note 4, at 542 (stating that courts “work very hard to 
avoid Klein”); Sager, supra note 4, at 2525 (“Klein typically is invoked as good law but not applicable to 
the case before the Court . . . .”). 
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arguments rarely gain traction with anyone other than entrepreneurial 
litigants, scholars, and the occasional stray judge.18 
In speaking of the myth of Klein, we must understand the paradoxical 
meanings of “myth” in law.  Most commonly, myth is a synonym for 
fiction, describing a false idea or premise.19  But myth also describes a 
story or belief that, although false in some respects, nevertheless is 
accepted and celebrated in the legal community because it 
“encapsulate[s] a community’s perceptions of its origins, its identity, or 
its commitments, and thereby advance[s] the lives of its members.”20  
Both meanings are in play here.  Calling Klein a myth suggests that our 
common judicial and scholarly understanding is wrong (false).  But it 
also suggests that this wrong (false) understanding is fundamental or 
necessary to the understanding and functioning of the political-legal 
community.21 
Both of Klein’s twin myths are false—the precedent is neither 
meaninglessly indeterminate nor vigorous. 
However inartfully written, the “doctrine” of Klein is not 
indeterminate.  Read historically with subsequent elaboration, limitation, 
and application, Klein readily admits of several related, clearly 
identifiable constitutional principles.  Once past the sweeping and 
inaccurate rhetoric of the opinion itself, three core principles22 emerge: 
(1) Congress cannot dictate to courts the outcome of particular litigation 
or command how courts should resolve particular legal and factual 
questions in a case;23 (2) Congress cannot compel courts to speak a 
“constitutional untruth” by dictating how to understand and apply the 
Constitution where courts’ independent judgment compels a different 
understanding or conclusion;24 and (3) Congress cannot enact legislation 
depriving individuals of their constitutional rights.25  The problem is that 
none of these principles is groundbreaking; all are common ideas, 
 18. Compare, e.g., Sager, supra note 4, at 2532–33, with Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2543.  
Compare Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2005) (Birch, J., 
specially concurring in denial of rehearing en banc), with Hartnett, supra note 4, at 580–81. 
 19. Pettys, supra note 1, at 992–93. 
 20. Id. at 993. 
 21. Id.  Fred Bloom captures the same idea in his concept of the “noble lie.”  Bloom, Noble Lie, 
supra note 1, at 975. 
 22. Because the statute at issue in Klein targeted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction, infra notes 
61–65 and accompanying text, a fourth reading of the case treats it as about “fundamental and timeless 
constraint on Congress’ otherwise broad authority to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts.”  
Tyler, supra note 7, at 88.  The jurisdictional point largely has fallen away in Klein discussions, 
however. 
 23. Infra Part III.A. 
 24. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2545; Sager, supra note 4, at 2529; infra Part III.B. 
 25. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 580; infra Part III.C. 
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reflected in other precedents and constitutional doctrines.  Moreover, 
they do little to provide a judicial basis for invalidating overreaching 
legislation. 
Even if false, however, Klein’s twin myths nevertheless remain 
fundamental to our community’s constitutional self-understanding.26  
Klein is a product of a unique time—the Civil War and 
Reconstruction—and a unique set of political and constitutional 
pathologies.27  That pathology included Union efforts to bring rebellious 
states and citizens back into the fold; a unique class of confiscated 
enemy property and efforts by property owners to recover proceeds;28 
and a three-way power struggle among Radical Republicans dominating 
Congress, Democratic President Andrew Johnson (and his non-Radical 
Republican successor, Ulysses S. Grant), and the Supreme Court.29  
Klein suggests that the Court can and will, in the extreme case, protect 
itself from the encroachment of other branches.  Alternatively, Klein 
works to keep Congress from pursuing its worst excesses in enacting 
legislation that genuinely might so invade the judicial province.  With 
Klein in the background, Congress dare not approach the constitutional 
line or engage in extreme separation-of-powers brinksmanship. 
At least not in ordinary times.  If Klein is a product of constitutional 
pathology, it does its constitutional heavy lifting only in similar periods.  
Genuinely Klein-violative legislation—in which Congress truly 
oversteps the limits of separation of powers—thus arises only in the 
worst of times.30  This perhaps justifies the “cult of Klein,” reverence for 
a tool that the Court uses to defend itself and the public against 
congressional overreaching in most-desperate times.  If that is Klein’s 
purpose, a fully contextualized understanding of the case and its 
resulting doctrine is necessary.  Whatever the socio-legal benefits the 
legal community derives from holding on to the myth of Klein and 
maintaining its cult as a separation-of-powers bulwark, its practical use 
and strength as a judicial tool to invalidate real, even pathological, 
legislation is a falsehood. 
Instead, recent Klein-vulnerable legislation and proposals are 
 26. Pettys, supra note 1, at 993. 
 27. See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 459 (1985) (defining pathology as “the phenomenon of an unusually serious challenge to one 
or more of the central norms of the constitutional regime”). 
 28. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 136–37 (1871). 
 29. Infra notes 53–58, 216–221 and accompanying text. 
 30. Although Vincent Blasi’s seminal work on constitutional pathology focuses on the role of the 
First Amendment in pathological times, he speaks in terms of constitutionalism generally and the need 
for stability as to basic structural arrangements.  Blasi, supra note 27, at 453.  This logically includes 
separation of powers and the arrangements of power among the three branches.  Id.; infra Part IV. 
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criticized and objected to as politically regrettable or unwise 
congressional enactments, especially for those who want to see private 
litigation used to enforce accountability on government and its officers.  
The instinct towards broad judicial independence and supremacy leads 
to a visceral sense that Congress overstepped its bounds, even if only as 
a policy matter.  But there is a central distinction between bad or unwise 
public policy and unconstitutional action.31  Couching policy 
preferences in constitutional Klein terms does not change this. 
This article proceeds in four steps.  Part II examines Klein in its full 
historical and political context, looking particularly at the Court’s 
sweeping, although largely inaccurate, rhetoric.  This overbroad 
language reveals much of how the myth of Klein and the cult 
surrounding that myth was born and has evolved. 
Part III identifies three core principles associated with Klein, 
subsequent case law, and commentary.  This Part shows Klein as a 
fiction, revealing that there are clear principles and ideas discernable 
from the case and that it is neither as opaque or as meaningless as many 
suggest, but that the principles are not unique, groundbreaking, or 
meaningfully constraining on Congress.  In other words, Klein is not as 
vigorous as many believe. 
Part IV considers the historic pathological context of Klein and how 
that context affects the doctrine’s current understanding and use.  In 
particular, it examines why extreme legislation that would violate Klein 
has not been enacted, perhaps suggesting that Klein plays a slightly more 
vigorous role outside the courts, as an ex ante check, keeping Congress 
from following its worst populist instincts.  Of course, pathological 
periods, such as those giving rise to the legislation at issue in Klein, 
occur precisely when that legislative check is most likely to be ignored. 
Part V examines the problem of conflating bad policy with 
unconstitutional policy, a conflation to which Klein contributes.  With its 
broad language, apparent indeterminacy, purportedly empty core, and 
perceived historical pedigree as a separation-of-powers, judicial-
independence trump card—that is, in light of the twin myths of opacity 
and vigor—Klein takes on an all-things-to-all-people quality.32  It 
becomes the ideal vehicle for constitutionalizing those ordinary policy 
preferences, however inappropriate such constitutionalization might be. 
United States v. Klein is a myth in both senses of the word—a source 
of rarely used and genuinely ineffectual constitutional principles, but 
principles on which we continue to place great rhetorical weight and 
 31. Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An 
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 898 (1984). 
 32. Young, supra note 4, at 1195. 
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through which we define our legal convictions and constitutional 
culture. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF KLEIN 
Klein arises out of the historical milieu of the Civil War and its 
aftermath and the unique political and inter-branch pathologies 
accompanying that time.  The false belief in Klein’s vigor and in Klein 
as a significant tool for judicially enforcing the limits on congressional 
power too readily ignores that historical context. 
During the Civil War, Congress enacted a series of laws to address 
the unique legal problem of abandoned and confiscated property in the 
South.  Congress particularly targeted cotton, the sale of which financed 
the Confederate war effort.33  The first law, enacted in 1861, provided 
for forfeiture of all property used in aiding, abetting, and promoting the 
insurrection.34  In 1862, a second statute empowered the President to 
make a public warning to those engaged in or aiding the rebellion to 
cease on threat of forfeiture of property.35 
The central act was passed in 1863.36  Congress empowered the 
Secretary of the Treasury to appoint agents to receive abandoned and 
captured property, sell it, and deposit proceeds into the general 
treasury.37  The 1863 Act also established procedures through which the 
owner of abandoned or captured property could bring a claim to recover 
proceeds in the Court of Claims: 
[A]ny person claiming to have been the owner of any such abandoned or 
captured property may, at any time within two years after the suppression 
of the rebellion, prefer his claim to the proceeds thereof in the Court of 
Claims; and on proof to the satisfaction of said court of his ownership of 
said property, of his right to the proceeds thereof, and that he has never 
given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion, to receive the residue of 
such proceeds . . . .38 
At the same time, Congress laid the groundwork for bringing 
Confederate sympathizers back into the Union.  An 1862 law had invited 
 33. Tyler, supra note 7, at 88–89; Young, supra note 4, at 1203–04. 
 34. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 130 (1871) (citing Act of Aug. 6, 1861, 12 
Stat. 319 (1861)). 
 35. Id. at 130 (citing Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 589 (1862)). 
 36. Young, supra note 4, at 1197–98. 
 37. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 131, 138; Tyler, supra note 7, at 89; Young, supra note 4, at 
1198. 
 38. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 131 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Abandoned Property Collection 
Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820 (1863)); Young, supra note 4, at 1198. 
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the President to extend pardon and amnesty39 to all persons who had 
participated in the rebellion on terms and conditions “expedient for the 
public welfare.”40  President Lincoln did so in December 1863, granting 
a full blanket pardon to all who had engaged in rebellion as participants 
or aiders-and-abettors, restoring all of their property rights, except as to 
slaves, upon the taking and keeping of a prescribed oath to support the 
Union, the Constitution, and all acts and proclamations regarding 
slaves.41  Lincoln defended the oath requirement: 
Laws and proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of 
aiding in the suppression of the rebellion.  To give them their fullest 
effect there had to be a pledge for their maintenance.  In my judgment 
they have aided, and will further aid, the cause for which they were 
intended. . . . [I]t is believed the Executive may lawfully claim it in return 
for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights . . . .42 
In July 1863, following Grant’s victory at Vicksburg, Union agents, 
acting under authority of the 1863 Act, seized six hundred bales of 
cotton belonging to V.F. Wilson; Wilson had marked the cotton 
“C.S.A.” to ensure its safe passage through the South.43  The cotton was 
sold for more than $125,000, and the proceeds were deposited in the 
Union general treasury.44  Wilson had acted as a surety on bonds for 
Confederate officers.45  In February 1864, following Lincoln’s pardon 
proclamation, Wilson took the required oath and received a pardon.46 
In 1865, Klein, the executor of Wilson’s estate, successfully 
petitioned the Court of Claims to recover proceeds from the sale of the 
cotton.  The court initially found that Wilson had been loyal in fact 
because he had given no aid or comfort to the rebellion.  The 
government subsequently presented evidence that Wilson had acted as a 
surety—a fact to which Klein stipulated—an act which the Supreme 
Court had held constituted giving aid and comfort to the rebellion.  
Nevertheless, the Court of Claims reaffirmed its judgment, finding the 
subsequent pardon removed the consequences of any actual disloyalty 
 39. Formally the law “authorized” the pardon.  Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 139.  But the 
President believed he held and could exercise the pardon power without congressional authorization.  
Id.; Tyler, supra note 7, at 90. 
 40. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 139–40. 
 41. Id. at 140; Tyler, supra note 7, at 89–90. 
 42. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 140 (quoting President Abraham Lincoln, State of the Union 
Address (Dec. 8, 1863)).  This was the first of several blanket pardons issued over the next several years.  
Id. at 140–42. 
 43. Young, supra note 4, at 1192. 
 44. Id. at 1198. 
 45. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132; Young, supra note 4, at 1199. 
 46. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132; Tyler, supra note 7, at 91–92; Young, supra note 4, at 1199. 
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and rendered him legally, if not factually, loyal.47 
While the government’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Padelford,48 a factually similar claim to recover 
proceeds on confiscated-and-sold property by a former Confederate 
surety who had taken the required oath and received a pardon.49  
Padelford had been disloyal in fact by acting as a surety for a 
Confederate officer.50  Reading the 1863 Act authorizing payment of 
proceeds to those who could prove loyalty in conjunction with the 1862 
law inviting presidential pardon reveals congressional intent to permit 
recovery by those who were factually loyal and by those rendered 
legally loyal by pardon.51  The pardon rendered Padelford innocent in 
law—as though he never had given aid and comfort—and purged his 
property of any taint.52 
Radical Republicans in Congress were outraged with the Padelford 
decision because it appeared to let off the hook the wealthy cotton 
growers who had financed the southern insurrection and who 
Republicans sought to sanction.53  Congressional objections to 
Padelford and to the Court of Claims decision in Klein were part of 
broader discontents.  In 1867, Congress statutorily removed the 
invitation or authorization for presidential pardon in confiscated-
property cases,54 likely as part of a broader, ongoing battle with 
President Andrew Johnson.55  Padelford was one of a series of Supreme 
Court decisions that rejected, narrowed, or interfered with the 
Republicans’ Reconstruction agenda.56  Congressional disaffection with 
the decision, and subsequent efforts to undo its effects,57 were part of 
 47. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 132; Tyler, supra note 7, at 93; Young, supra note 4, at 1199. 
 48. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870). 
 49. Id. at 539–42; Young, supra note 4, at 1201–03.  One difference, ultimately irrelevant, was 
that Padelford took the oath and received the pardon before his property was seized, while Wilson came 
forward for the pardon only after the seizure.  Id. at 1201 n.62.  See Hartnett, supra note 4, at 573. 
 50. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 539; Young, supra note 4, at 1201–02. 
 51. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 543; Young, supra note 4, at 1202–03. 
 52. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 543. 
 53. Tyler, supra note 7, at 94–95; Young, supra note 4, at 1193, 1204. 
 54. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141–42 (1871). 
 55. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 247–48 (1988); 
Laura F. Edwards, The Civil War and Reconstruction, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN 
AMERICA 329 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).  Johnson was impeached a year 
later.  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 18–20 (1998) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, VOL. 2]; FONER, supra, at 333–35; Edwards, supra, at 329–30. 
 56. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOL. 1: FOUNDATIONS 101 (1991) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, VOL. 1]; FONER, supra note 55, at 529; Edwards, supra note 55, at 335; see also, e.g., 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 
(1872). 
 57. When Senator Drake took to the Senate floor and introduced legislation to undo Klein and 
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broader political jockeying among Congress, the President, and the 
Court regarding the direction of the post-bellum nation, particularly on 
matters of national power and the reintegration of southern states and 
citizens into the Union.58 
Congress’ response reflected an unabashed attempt to undo the lower 
court judgment in Klein and to ensure that no future cases resulted in 
judgments for claimants relying on pardons.  Two parts of the legislative 
response, contained in a proviso to an 1870 spending bill, achieved that 
result.  First, Congress provided that 
[N]o pardon or amnesty granted by the President . . . nor any acceptance 
of such pardon or amnesty, nor oath taken . . . shall be admissible in 
evidence on the part of any claimant in the Court of Claims as evidence in 
support of any claim against the United States . . . but the proof of loyalty 
required [by the 1863 Act] shall be made by proof of the matters required, 
irrespective of the effect of any executive proclamation, pardon, amnesty, 
or other act of condonation or oblivion.59 
Further, the proviso deemed that when a claimant had received a 
pardon 
[A]nd such pardon shall recite in substance that such person took part in 
the late rebellion . . . or was guilty of any act of rebellion . . . and such 
pardon shall have been accepted in writing by the person to whom the 
same issued without an express disclaimer of, and protestation against, 
such fact of guilt contained in such acceptance, such pardon and 
acceptance shall be taken and deemed . . . conclusive evidence that such 
person did take part in, and give aid and comfort to, the late rebellion[.]60 
The question remained of what to do in pending cases such as Klein, 
where the Court of Claims had rendered judgment in favor of the 
claimant based on his having been made legally innocent by virtue of the 
pardon.  The original Senate bill would have required the Supreme Court 
to reverse any judgments for pardoned claimants that were pending on 
appeal, presumably resulting in a remand and a new determination by 
the Court of Claims, with the likely result that the claimant would lose 
on remand under the new legal rule that an uncontested pardon was 
conclusive proof of disloyalty.61  During the Senate debates, support 
similar decisions, he waved a copy of Padelford.  See Young, supra note 4, at 1204. 
 58. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 2, supra note 55, at 123, 199–200, 209; FONER, supra note 55, at 183–
84, 237–38, 250–51; Edwards, supra note 55, at 327–29; infra notes 216–221 and accompanying text. 
 59. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133–34, 143 (quoting Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 18 Stat. 230 
(1870)); Young, supra note 4, at 1207–08. 
 60. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134 (quoting Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 18 Stat. 230 (1870)), 
143–44. 
 61. Tyler, supra note 7, at 95–96; Young, supra note 4, at 1204–05, 1210. 
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shifted to reliance on congressional power over the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.62  The bill stripped the Court of appellate 
jurisdiction over all cases in which a pardon had been used as evidence 
of loyalty, requiring the Court to dismiss “the cause” for want of 
jurisdiction.63  Importantly, Republicans intended this to mean dismissal 
of “the case—everything.”64  It was not enough to have the appeal to the 
Supreme Court dismissed, which would have left the Wilson Estate with 
its Court of Claims judgment in tact; Congress wanted the lower-court 
judgment undone and the entire lawsuit dismissed where the claim was 
based on a pardon.65 
The Klein Court struck back, invalidating the proviso and its 
purported limits on appellate jurisdiction.  First, the Court rejected the 
argument that the proviso was a permissible exercise of congressional 
power under the Exceptions Clause.66  The proviso did not withhold 
appellate jurisdiction “except as a means to an end” of denying 
presidential pardons the effect that the Court adjudged them to have in 
Padelford.67  Rather, the purpose of the law was to “deny to pardons 
granted by the President the effect which this court had adjudged them 
to have.”68 
The denial of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court was “founded solely 
on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by 
Congress.”69  Congress was not appropriately regulating appellate 
jurisdiction, but “prescrib[ing] a rule for the decision of a cause in a 
particular way.”70  This was “not an exercise of the acknowledged 
power of Congress” over the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.71  The Court 
was required to dismiss the appeal, even if it believed the judgment 
below should be affirmed by virtue of the pardon.72  Such a requirement 
was problematic in two respects: (1) it allowed the government, as a 
party to the case, to decide in its own favor; and (2) it allowed Congress 
to prescribe rules of decision to the judiciary in pending cases.73
 62. Young, supra note 4, at 1207–08.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 63. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134. 
 64. Young, supra note 4, at 1208 (quoting legislative debates and statements of Senator 
Edmunds, sponsor of the final measure). 
 65. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 134; Young, supra note 4, at 1210, 1221–22. 
 66. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 146. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
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The Klein Court distinguished its own decision in Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling Bridge Company.74  After a court had decreed that a particular 
bridge was a public nuisance and ordered its abatement, Congress re-
designated the bridge as a post road, eliminating the need for 
abatement.75  The Supreme Court held that the original nuisance decree 
no longer was enforceable because the bridge had, by virtue of the new 
law and new legal designation, ceased to be a nuisance and ceased to 
require abatement.76  The difference between Klein and Wheeling 
Bridge was that in the latter Congress had not prescribed any “arbitrary” 
rule of decision.77  Rather, Congress had created new legal 
circumstances to which the Court simply applied ordinary rules.78  By 
contrast, in Klein Congress had forbidden the Court to give the pardon 
the evidentiary effect the Court, in its own judgment, believed it should 
have, instead directing the Court to give it the precisely cont 79
The second, seemingly separate basis for rejecting the legislation was 
that it impaired the effect of a presidential pardon.  By requiring the 
Court to view pardons as evidence of disloyalty, it functionally required 
the Court to treat them as null and void, without legal effect.80  This 
infringed the Executive’s constitutional power.81  More problematically, 
it compelled the courts to be instrumental in that infringement.82 
The recognized defects in the proviso dictated the result in Klein 
itself—deny the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal and to 
reverse the Court of Claims decision awarding proceeds to Wilson’s 
Estate.  The more difficult question is what to do with Klein, specifically 
its broad language and established principles.  We turn to that question 
next. 
III. THREE JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE PRINCIPLES 
It is an article of academic faith that Klein is, at best, lacking clarity 
and, at worst, opaque.83  But calling it opaque lends indeterminacy, and 
 74. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855). 
 75. Id. at 429.  See also Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 
446–47. 
 76. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (discussing Wheeling, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 421). 
 77. Id. at 146–47; Hartnett, supra note 4, at 579. 
 78. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.; Araiza, supra note 14, at 1075 (describing problem that proviso made courts into 
Congress’ “constitutional puppet”). 
 83. See sources cited supra notes 14–16. 
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a presumed meaninglessness, to the resulting doctrine that allows Klein-
based arguments to at least be raised against all manner of laws.84  In 
fact, careful reading of Klein, in light of its evolution in subsequent—
and more recent—cases, reveals three clear, somewhat related judicially 
enforceable constitutional principles.  Paradoxically, however, avoiding 
indeterminacy and revealing core principles runs headlong into the 
doctrine’s lack of vigor.  The identifiable principles are neither 
exceptional nor particularly powerful limits on Congress that can be 
wielded to invalidate likely or significant legislation. 
In other words, the twin myths of Klein stand and fall together.  
Wading through the case and its progeny reveals a core meaning; 
finding that core meaning shows that the underlying principles lack real 
doctrinal force. 
A. Congressional Control over Fact-Finding and Litigation Outcomes 
One potential principle of Klein is that there are limits on 
congressional control over substantive legal rules and litigation 
outcomes under those rules. 
1. Dictating Substantive Rules of Decision 
Oft-cited language in Klein prohibits Congress from prescribing rules 
of decision for cases in federal courts.  The Court criticized the 1870 
proviso as denying jurisdiction “solely on the application of a rule of 
decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.”85 
Importantly, however, no act of Congress—other than the proviso in 
Klein itself—has been deemed unconstitutional under that principle.86  
Moreover, that statement cannot literally be true.87  Congress prescribes 
rules of decision whenever it enacts substantive law that controls 
primary conduct and establishes the legal rules courts apply to resolve 
disputes under that substantive law.  Consider, for example, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.88  In prohibiting employers from firing people 
“because of” race and other characteristics, Congress established a rule 
of decision that courts apply in resolving discrimination claims under the 
 84. See Young, supra note 4, at 1195.  See also Tyler, supra note 7, at 103–04. 
 85. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871); Hartnett, supra note 4, at 577; 
Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 444–45. 
 86. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 581. 
 87. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2549; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 446 (labeling the 
Court’s statement “wrong”); Tyler, supra note 7, at 105 (“This proposition cannot be reconciled with the 
settled principle that courts are obliged to apply otherwise valid law as they find it.”). 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). 
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statute; the rule requires a court to find in favor of, and grant relief to, a 
plaintiff who can present evidence showing that he was fired because of 
racial animosity.89 
The Klein Court seemed to recognize the literal incoherence of that 
language, as indicated by its efforts to distinguish Wheeling Bridge.90  
By redefining the bridge as a post road under federal law, Congress 
imposed a new rule of decision to be applied by the Court—the bridge 
took on its congressionally defined status and the Court was bound by 
that status.  The Court distinguished Wheeling Bridge on the ground that 
Congress had not prescribed an “arbitrary rule of decision,” but simply 
had left courts to “apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances 
created by the act.”91  But those new circumstances properly included a 
new rule of decision: the bridge was a federally designated post road and 
could not be a public nuisance as a matter of federal law. 
Subsequent cases have reconciled Klein and Wheeling Bridge by 
recognizing that Congress remains free to amend generally controlling 
substantive law, even as that change affects litigation by establishing a 
new rule of decision.92  Congress can change substantive law 
prospectively, retrospectively, or both.  Although Klein twice 
emphasized the problem of the proviso applying to pending cases,93 
courts regularly apply valid law in effect at the time a case is being 
decided, even where controlling law has changed during pendency of a 
case or between trial court judgment and appeal.94  Congress only needs 
to make its retroactive intent plain.95  Lower courts have become highly 
deferential to such changes in law, so long as Congress changes the 
overall substantive legal landscape—the new legal circumstances96—in 
 89. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 577–78.  See also Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059 (“[A]ll legislation 
amounts to the imposition of legal liability on individuals involved in certain fact patterns.”). 
 90. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–47 (discussing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge 
Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851)); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 446–47. 
 91. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–47; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 446–47. 
 92. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon 
Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 440–41 (1992); Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 426 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Nat’l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Redish & 
Pudelski, supra note 4, at 456–57; Sager, supra note 4, at 2527. 
 93. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (stating that the government argument “is founded solely on 
the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress” and questioning, “[c]an 
we do so without allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department 
of the government in cases pending before it?”). 
 94. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994); Hartnett, supra note 4, at 578; 
Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 446; Tyler, supra note 7, at 105; Young, supra note 4, at 1240 
n.238. 
 95. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. 
 96. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147. 
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some “detectable way.”97  So narrowed, this principle does not impose 
meaningful limits on congressional power.  It holds Klein in check, 
keeping it from imposing overbroad restrictions on Congress’ essential 
ability to legislate in beneficial and necessary ways.98 
Another explanation for the outcome in Klein is that the proviso 
targeted specific, pending litigation.  Congress was aware that the 
government’s appeal in Klein was pending and that Padelford 
controlled, which meant the government likely would lose on appeal.  In 
his comprehensive history of Klein, Gordon Young demonstrates that 
Senate Radical Republicans knew it would be insufficient merely to 
control the evidentiary effect of pardons prospectively because that 
would leave in place judgments already rendered by the Court of 
Claims.99  It was thus necessary for Congress specifically to target cases 
pending on appeal, whether by requiring the Court to reverse judgments 
based on pardons, as initially proposed by Senator Drake, or by stripping 
the Court of appellate jurisdiction over such appeals with a requirement 
to dismiss “the cause,” as ultimately enacted.100 
But even this anti-targeting principle does not do much work.  The 
closest call was Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.101  The case arose 
out of an ongoing controversy over Northwest timber harvesting and its 
effect on the habitat of the spotted owl.102  Two lawsuits by 
environmental groups challenged the government’s management of 
thirteen national forests and Bureau of Land Management lands in 
Oregon and Washington as being contrary to five separate federal 
statutes.103  In the Northwest Timber Compromise of 1990, Congress 
established comprehensive new rules governing timber harvesting for a 
limited period of time, expanding harvesting in some areas while 
prohibiting it in others.104  At the heart of the controversy was a 
provision stating: 
 97. Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1569–70 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 98. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1075 (“In a very real sense, any conventional statute ‘directs 
results,’ yet the enactment of statutes remains the quintessential legislative function.”); Hartnett, supra 
note 4, at 577–78; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 448 (“[T]here exists no reason, in constitutional 
theory or doctrine, why Congress may not enact subconstitutional, generally applicable rules of 
decision . . . .”). 
 99. Young, supra note 4, at 1210, 1221–22. 
 100. Id. at 1208, 1210. 
 101. 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
 102. Id. at 431–32; Araiza, supra note 14, at 1065; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 455–56; 
Sager, supra note 4, at 2527. 
 103. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 432; Araiza, supra note 14, at 1065; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, 
at 456; Sager, supra note 4, at 2527. 
 104. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 433; Araiza, supra note 14, at 1065; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, 
at 456; Sager, supra note 4, at 2527. 
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Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas 
according to [provisions of the Compromise] on the thirteen national 
forests in Oregon and Washington . . . is adequate consideration for the 
purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for [the 
two pending district court cases, mentioned by name].105 
The Supreme Court upheld the compromise as a permissible 
alteration of substantive law.106  The targeted lawsuits initially would 
have succeeded if the challenged harvesting violated any of five statutes, 
but those claims now failed so long as the harvesting did not violate 
either of the two relevant provisions in the amending statute.107  The 
Court was not troubled by the explicit statutory reference to pending 
litigation, which simply was generalized shorthand for identifying the 
five previous statutory requirements that formed the basis for the 
lawsuits and that functionally had been amended by the Compromise.  
Instead of naming each statutory provision amended, Congress named 
the litigation in which the now-amended provisions were in play.108  
Any effect on the two pending cases still resulted from the modification 
of applicable substantive law. 
Robertson marked the closest Congress has come to violating the 
principle of Klein and many commentators argue that the Court was 
wrong not to strike down the law.109  Paradoxically, Robertson makes it 
easier for courts to reject constitutional challenges to future legislation—
after all, if the legislation at issue in Robertson did not violate Klein, 
nothing will.110  Consider the D.C. Circuit’s decision in National 
Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton.111  The plaintiffs brought an 
action seeking to enjoin construction of the World War II Memorial on 
the National Mall, alleging that various federal agencies and officials 
had violated a host of federal statutes in approving the Memorial design 
 105. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 434–35 (quoting Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1990, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 745 (1990)); Sager, supra note 4, at 2527. 
 106. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438, 440–41. 
 107. Id. at 438.  See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059, 1072; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 
457; Sager, supra note 4, at 2527.  See also Araiza, supra note 14, at 1071 (“The key to the Court’s 
conclusion . . . seems to have been its observation that . . . [the amended law] would operate to change 
defendants’ duties under statutes . . . .”). 
 108. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1058; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 456; Sager, supra note 4, 
at 2527. 
 109. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059 (“[I]t is hard to avoid the feeling that there is something 
inappropriately non-legislative about this statute.”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 455 (arguing 
that Robertson shows the Court playing “fast and loose” with this principle); Sager, supra note 4, at 
2527. 
 110. Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
Klein argument as to statute that “presents no more difficulty than the statute upheld” in Robertson). 
 111. 269 F.3d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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and construction.112  While litigation was pending, Congress enacted a 
law requiring expeditious construction of the Memorial, 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.”113  Again, Congress used 
generalized blanket language to functionally amend any and all laws that 
might have been used to block construction.  Congress did not identify 
the overridden statutory provisions by name, but left it for the courts to 
ascertain that all laws in play in the pending case had been superseded. 
Save Our Mall captures the emptiness of the argument that legislation 
is invalid if too litigation-specific.  First, it was clear under Wheeling 
Bridge that Congress could have imposed new standards in identifiable 
cases that already had proceeded to judgment and to issuance of an 
injunction.  Congress thus can impose new substantive rules in pending 
actions for injunctive relief where no injunction had been issued at the 
time of the legislative change.114  Second, plaintiffs in Save Our Mall 
conceded during oral argument that the new legislation would have been 
a valid amendment to substantive law had it been enacted prior to 
commencement of the lawsuit, even if enacted in explicit anticipation of 
that particular lawsuit.115  Given that concession, the court rejected the 
idea that specificity became fatal merely because the legislation was 
enacted against a pending, rather than anticipated, lawsuit that had not 
yet proceeded to judgment. 
2. Dictating Facts and Outcomes 
Rhetoric aside, Congress has power to prescribe non-rights-infringing 
rules of decision that bind courts, even through retroactive amendments 
to existing rules made applicable to pending cases.116  Establishing and 
amending legal rules entails determining legal standards, identifying the 
significant legal and factual issues that courts must apply to a set of 
circumstances, and dictating the legal consequences that flow from the 
courts’ application of the legal standards to a set of facts.117 
What really is going on under Klein is a prohibition on Congress 
using its legislative power to predetermine litigation outcomes through 
explicit commands to courts as to how to resolve particular factual and 
 112. Id. at 1093–94. 
 113. Id. at 1094 (quoting Approval of World War II Memorial Site and Design, Pub. L. No 107-
11, § 1, 115 Stat. 19 (2001)). 
 114. Id. at 1097. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1075 n.97; Hartnett, supra note 4, at 578; Tyler, supra note 7, at 
106; supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 117. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059 (“[A]ll legislation amounts to the imposition of legal liability 
on individuals involved in certain fact patterns.”). 
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legal issues or telling courts who should prevail on given facts under 
existing law.118  This knocks out blatant examples—such as a law 
stating “In the case of A v. B, pending in the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida, A shall prevail,” or “In all cases 
filed, courts shall find that no federal environmental laws were violated 
in the management of national forest land 119
But such blatantly violative enactments seem unlikely, which perhaps 
explains why no actual laws have been invalidated under this 
principle.120  Consider Robertson again.  Although the 1990 law 
explicitly referenced pending litigation, it did not dictate which party 
should prevail, did not dictate findings of fact, and did not command a 
conclusion that any particular timber harvests or sales violated federal 
law.  The amended law merely established new legal standards to be 
applied in determining the validity of sales and harvests; it did not 
dictate how to apply those legal standards.  The court still determined 
whether those standards had been satisfied and decided the case 
accordingly.121 
 118. Id. at 1079, 1088 (describing distinction between Congress changing law and Congress 
directing results in particular cases, although recognizing the difficulty courts have had in drawing the 
line); Caminker, supra note 4, at 539 (calling this the “narrower and more traditional understanding of 
the Klein principle”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 445 (“If Congress may not itself resolve 
individual litigations, its direction to the courts as to how to resolve specific disputes is constitutionally 
problematic.”); Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political 
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 718 (1995) (“Congress may not, through legislation, dictate the 
resolution of a particular litigation”); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving 
Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893, 979 (2003) (arguing that best 
reading of Klein is “prohibition against Congress dictating specific results or interpretations of laws and 
facts”). 
 119. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1125 (“[A] statute deeming pre-existing law to be satisfied is 
analogous to a judicial decision reaching the same conclusion . . . .”); Gunther, supra note 31, at 910; 
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exercise 
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (1953) (“I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the 
power of Congress to tell the court how to decide it.”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 457 (“Any 
legislation that directs findings in specifically referenced litigation should categorically be deemed to 
violate Klein.”); Redish, supra note 118, at 718 (arguing that “every observer reasonably” can 
understand that “Congress may not adjudicate individual litigations”). 
 120. The Court has invalidated similar laws without relying on Klein.  This arguably is the case 
with United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987).  The Court struck down a federal statute that 
prohibited collateral challenges to the constitutionality of a prior administrative order of deportation 
where that order was an element of a subsequent crime, unlawful reentry after deportation, prosecuted in 
federal court.  Id. at 837–39.  Although the context was different, functionally the statute forced courts 
to accept a non-judicial factual determination and prohibited courts from engaging in independent 
analysis about the constitutionality of the underlying order, which is—what this principle of Klein 
purports to invalidate.  Yet the Court never mentioned Klein.  See also Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 
114, 123–25 (1946) (reading statute to permit judicial review of constitutionality of draft board order in 
subsequent prosecution for refusing induction, without citing Klein).  Thanks to Gordon Young for 
raising this point. 
 121. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 438–39 (1992); see Ecology Ctr. v. 
WASSERMAN FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  3:43:02 PM 
2010] THE IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF KLEIN 71 
 
Consider Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms,122 where the Supreme Court 
addressed congressional creation of a new, potentially longer limitations 
period for certain securities fraud claims.123  The new provision stated 
that any claims previously dismissed as time-barred under the old 
limitations rule should be reinstated if the claim would have been timely 
under the new rule.124  The new limitations period “indisputably does set 
out substantive legal standards for the Judiciary to apply, and in that 
sense changes the law (even if solely retroactively).”125  Yet the Court 
rejected a Klein challenge.  The law did not dictate to courts how to 
decide the facts underlying the limitations issue or whether to conclude 
that a particular claim was timely under the controlling period.  The law 
only told courts the length of the new period and the legal consequences 
of judicially determined conclusions in a case involving particular 
factual circumstances. 
Of course, all legislation “directs results” and imposes legal liability 
on certain fact patterns.126  Congress thus does not impermissibly dictate 
outcomes so long as it merely identifies the relevant legal and factual 
issues that dictate outcomes.  Klein only requires that courts be left a 
role; courts must retain the power to exercise their independent best 
judgment to find facts, to apply the legal standard to those facts, to 
decide whether the congressionally dictated rule of decision has been 
satisfied or violated, and to decide the outcome of the case before the 
court. 
Accepting that legal rules direct results presents a wrinkle: Congress 
designs legal rules, either in the first instance or through an amendment 
to the substantive legal landscape, with the “hope” that rules produce 
certain outcomes on certain facts.  This is always Congress’ purpose in 
enacting or modifying the law—to achieve substantive policy goals 
through the operation and judicial enforcement of legal rules.127  
Liability rules seek to protect and incentivize conduct deemed socially 
beneficial while sanctioning or deterring conduct deemed socially 
Castaneda, 426 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that Klein is not violated where Congress 
changed the underlying law but left to the courts the role of determining whether new legal criteria had 
been met); Sager, supra note 4, at 2534. 
 122. 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
 123. In Lampf, Pleva, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991), the Court had 
held that the limitations period on securities fraud claims expired one year after discovery of facts 
showing the violation and within three years of the violation.  Congress provided that, for all actions 
filed on or before June 19, 1991 (the day Lampf was decided), district courts should adopt the limitations 
period of the state in which they sat.  15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (2006); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–15. 
 124. § 788aa-1(b); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 214–15. 
 125. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218. 
 126. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1059, 1075. 
 127. See id. at 1072. 
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destructive.128  When Congress prohibited racial discrimination in 
employment in Title VII, it “hoped” that plaintiffs who could prove they 
had been fired under certain circumstances would prevail in their 
subsequent civil actions.  When Congress enacted the 1990 Northwest 
Timber Compromise, it hoped that some timber harvesting could go 
forward under the more-relaxed standards and that a litigation effort to 
stop harvesting would fail.  Congress viewed the construction of the 
World War II Memorial as a socially beneficial activity and altered rules 
to eliminate legal barriers to that construction.129 
This is particularly true when Congress amends the legal landscape.  
Congress has seen how courts have applied existing legal rules and it has 
seen the outcomes of cases under those rules.  Dissatisfied with those 
results, Congress changes the legal rule and legal circumstances so that 
future cases come out differently on similar facts.130 
But hoping for an outcome in a particular case under its legal rules is 
not dictating that outcome.  If it were, all legislative-override 
amendments would be invalid, which clearly is not the case.131  
Moreover, legislative intent remains the touchstone for determining 
statutory meaning.132  Courts must account for substantive legislative 
goals reflected in the statute when applying the law to a set of facts in 
litigation; legislative “hope” plays a necessary role in judicial 
understanding and application of statutes.  Nevertheless, it remains the 
judicial domain to apply congressionally dictated legal standards to a set 
of facts and to reach independent conclusions in a particular case. 
 128. See S. Jay Plager, Challenges for Intellectual Property Law in the Twenty-first Century: 
Indeterminacy and Other Problems, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 69, 70; Richard A. Epstein, The Tort/Crime 
Distinction: A Decade Later, 76 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996). 
 129. See Approval of World War II Memorial Site and Design, Pub. L. No. 107-11, 115 Stat. 19 
(2001); Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1093–94 (2001). 
 130. See Caminker, supra note 4, at 532–33; Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the 
Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
511, 520, 525 (2009); see also Araiza, supra note 14, at 1127 (“Congress should be able to ensure that 
its understanding of pre-existing law controls, by enacting a subsequent statute enshrining explicitly that 
understanding.”). 
 131. See Widiss, supra note 130, at 525–26 (discussing statistics on frequency of congressional 
overrides of judicial interpretations of federal statutes).  For a recent example, see the Lilly Ledbetter 
Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, which overrode the Court’s decision on calculating 
the limitations period on statutory equal-pay claims in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 
U.S. 618 (2007). 
 132. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 596 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“[C]ongressional intent should guide us in matters of statutory interpretation.”); United States v. 
Rosenbohm, 564 F.3d 820, 823 (7th Cir. 2009); James Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of 
Political Branch Interpretive Assets (Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies, Working Paper 
No. 123), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597260. 
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3. Klein as Drafting Rule 
Unfortunately, this sounds like a dispute over legislative format, 
turning Klein into nothing more than a drafting guide.133  Congress can 
avoid the force of Klein by its choice of statutory language and form.  
By avoiding obviously problematic language—“A shall prevail against 
B” or “The court shall find that federal rights were not violated”—
Congress preempts most Klein challenges. 
There still will be close cases.  Imagine that Congress wanted to 
suspend the limitations period for a class of cases through a law 
providing that certain claims may be brought “without regard” to the 
statute of limitations.  This statute admits of two readings.  We might 
read it to change the law to eliminate the statute of limitations as an 
applicable defense and as an issue for the court to deal with; 
alternatively, we might read it as Congress telling the court that, when 
the limitations defense is raised, the court must reject the defense and 
find the claim timely.134  From the standpoint of protecting Congress’ 
ability to draft substantive law, the former is the better and necessary 
reading.135 
Larry Sager and Evan Caminker recognize that this basic principle of 
Klein can be overcome through alternative drafting.136  But they reach 
different conclusions about that fact.  Sager argues that no-dictating-
outcomes cannot be the core principle of Klein because such an 
understanding “threatens to exalt form over substance.”137  In fact, the 
Court did just that in Robertson, paying nominal obeisance to Klein but 
discarding any meaningful distinction in the form that amending 
legislation takes.138  The principle does no meaningful constitutional 
work; Congress can draft around it and courts look for ways to uphold 
laws that come close to the line.139 
Caminker counters that even if only a drafting rule, it remains a rule 
that matters.140  Language is what law does.  Statutory language makes a 
difference to public understanding of potential conflicts between the 
 133. Caminker, supra note 4, at 542 (stating that Klein arguments “boil[] down to the question 
whether the Klein rule is in practice nothing more than a trivial rule of drafting etiquette”). 
 134. Compare id. at 541 with id. at 540. 
 135. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1133 (emphasizing propriety of Congress amending substantive 
law by providing that new legal rule applies “notwithstanding” any other legal provisions). 
 136. See Caminker, supra note 4, at 541–42; Sager, supra note 4, at 2526–27.  See also Araiza, 
supra note 14, at 1134 (questioning whether a principle similar to Klein “may be problematic at its core: 
easily evadable by expedients of unquestioned constitutionality”). 
 137. Sager, supra note 4, at 2526 (calling it “a relic of a more formalistic era”). 
 138. Id. at 2527. 
 139. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1088–89. 
 140. Caminker, supra note 4, at 542. 
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legislative and judicial branches, should Congress be tempted to cross 
the line and encroach on norms of judicial independence and the rule of 
law.141  This is formalism, but perhaps a good kind of formalism, 
preserving the realm in which judiciary exercises its prerogatives.142  
Nevertheless, as Caminker acknowledges, his point is limited by 
repeated judicial rejections of Klein arguments and the often-extreme 
judicial efforts to avoid Klein problems.143 
If the prohibition on dictating outcomes is a rigid one that cannot be 
drafted around, Klein itself was correct.  Perhaps it is only the 
subsequent softening of the rule—by recognizing an ethereal line 
between amending substantive law and dictating outcomes—that gets it 
wrong.144  Thus Robertson, with a statute imposing a blanket alteration 
of five different environmental statutes affecting the outcome of two 
specifically identified cases about the spotted owl habitat, was a 
categorical violation of Klein.145  The same is true of Save Our Mall, 
where Congress similarly undermined specific litigation affecting the 
Memorial with a blanket amendment of all potentially applicable law.146  
This broad reading of the prohibition on dictating outcomes justifies 
Klein’s mythic, cult-like status—it is a precedent that should and would 
possess significant force but for its subsequent watering-down.147 
But it also dramatically narrows Congress’ power ever to amend 
substantive law.  It calls Wheeling Bridge—the precedent the Klein 
Court expressly reaffirmed and distinguished—into question because 
Congress similarly altered the applicable legal rule to be applied to an 
ongoing prospective remedy.148  And it calls into question Congress’ 
recognized power to make new law applicable to pending cases.149 
Martin Redish and Christopher Pudelski offer another way around the 
nothing-but-a-drafting-rule problem.  They argue that Klein prohibits 
 141. Id. 
 142. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1090, 1134; Caminker, supra note 4, at 542. 
 143. Caminker, supra note 4, at 542.  See supra notes 92–115 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1089. 
 145. See id. at 1059 (“[I]t is hard to avoid the feeling that there is something inappropriately non-
legislative about this statute.”); Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 455 (arguing that Robertson shows 
the Court playing “fast and loose” with this principle); Sager, supra note 4, at 2527; supra notes 101–
110, 121 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Nat’l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1096–97 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 147. Cf. Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 1720–21 (“Klein is far from 
jurisprudentially trivial, even if the facts seem historically quaint.”); Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2549 
(“Klein should not be discarded as a badly-reasoned relic with no contemporary significance.”). 
 148. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146–47 (1871); Redish & Pudelski, supra 
note 4, at 446–47; supra notes 74–79, 90–98, and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.  But see Araiza, supra note 14, at 1130; 
Young, supra note 4, at 1248–49. 
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Congress from deceiving the public about the true state of substantive 
law.150  The problem with the 1870 proviso was that it left the 1863 Act 
in full force—all property owners could recover on proof of ownership 
and loyalty—but altered the evidentiary rules related to pardons to 
prevent a class of owners from recovering under the 1863 Act.151  
Congress deceived the public about the true state of the law by 
manipulating evidentiary and procedural rules; while substantive law 
appeared to the public to go one way, procedural law commanded 
different results in the case at hand.152 
This focus on deception resolves the statute-of-limitations 
hypothetical previously offered.  If Congress must be clear, open, and 
honest to the public about the state of substantive law, it must make 
clear that the limitations period has been eliminated as an applicable 
defense in all cases.  It would impermissibly deceive the public for 
Congress to appear to leave the defense in place but compel courts to 
reject the defense in every case.  The no-deception principle functions as 
an interpretive guide for statutes that authorize claims “notwithstanding” 
or “without regard to” some other statute or legal rule, compelling the 
conclusion that Congress replaced prior law with a new rule of decision 
rather than dictating an outcome. 
Finally, consider the possibility that Klein was wrong—the Court 
misapplied the no-dictating-outcomes principle and the result in Klein 
was entirely a product of poor legislative drafting.  The 1870 proviso 
arguably did not dictate outcomes beyond what legislation normally 
does.  Congress did not declare that the United States must prevail in 
these cases, nor did it tell courts to decide that Wilson or any claimant 
had or had not been loyal, in fact or in law.  Congress simply changed 
the legal effect of a pardon for all cases going forward—an uncontested 
pardon could not establish loyalty.153  Courts retained independent 
judgment to resolve these cases, guided by the amended law.154  It 
remained with the court to examine the claimant’s pardon and decide 
whether he properly contested the recitation of crimes, whether he had 
been loyal in law or fact, and whether he was entitled to proceeds under 
that new law. 
Senator Drake’s original proposal required the Supreme Court to 
“reverse” any Court of Claims judgment based on a pardon and, 
 150. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 440. 
 151. Id. at 447, 461. 
 152. Id. at 450–51. 
 153. Id. at 445. 
 154. To the extent the law amended was the constitutional law of pardons, that raises a distinct 
Klein problem, discussed infra Part III.B. 
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presumably, remand to the Court of Claims for a new determination 
under the amended law.155  One might argue that this “dictates” an 
outcome on appeal—the Supreme Court must reverse if an uncontested 
pardon had been relied on below.  But again, the Court retained an 
independent role.  It would decide whether the pardon had been relied 
on below and whether that pardon had been contested; Congress merely 
established the consequence of that finding.  And this brings us back to 
inherent formalism.  Congress could have achieved its preferred result 
simply by imposing the ordinary rule that the appellate court applies the 
law as of the time of the appeal.  The Supreme Court thus would have 
recognized that the Court of Claims judgment based on an uncontested 
pardon could not stand under the amended law; the judgment would 
have been reversed even without a legislative command. 
B. Speaking Untruths and Dictating Meaning 
The second express holding in Klein was that the proviso had the 
effect of impairing a presidential pardon, thereby infringing on the 
constitutional authority of the President by making acceptance of an 
uncontested pardon per se proof of disloyalty.156  And by requiring 
courts to give the pardon the congressionally determined effect, 
Congress directed the court to be an instrument of that impairment.157  
Congress overstepped its constitutional authority viz a viz the judiciary 
by attempting to dictate to the judiciary the scope and meaning of the 
constitutional presidential pardon power and the effects of the exercise 
of that power.  That restraint on congressional control over judicial 
constitutional analysis need not and should not be limited only to the 
pardon power and not other parts of the Constitution.158 
Sager labels this Klein’s true first principle: 
The judiciary will not allow itself to be made to speak and act against its 
own best judgment on matters within its competence which have great 
consequence for our political community.  The judiciary will not permit 
its articulate authority to be subverted to serve ends antagonistic to its 
actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts to make it seem to 
support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees.159 
 155. See Tyler, supra note 7, at 95–96; Young, supra note 4, at 1204–05, 1210; supra notes 61–65 
and accompanying text. 
 156. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1871).  See Meltzer, supra note 14, 
at 2538–39, 2549; Sager, supra note 4, at 2531. 
 157. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 148; Sager, supra note 4, at 2531. 
 158. Tyler, supra note 7, at 107. 
 159. Sager, supra note 4, at 2529. 
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Put succinctly, Congress may not compel courts to speak a 
“constitutional untruth.”160 
There are two ways to understand this idea.  A broader, judicial-
supremacy-centered take is that courts, not Congress, determine 
constitutional meaning.  Klein then becomes unexceptional, a 
straightforward assertion that it is not for the majoritarian legislature to 
declare the meaning of the counter-majoritarian Constitution.161  A 
narrower, departmentalist take is that while Congress can interpret the 
Constitution,162 it cannot insist that the judiciary adopt the congressional 
interpretation as its own and it cannot compel the judiciary to apply that 
interpretation within the adjudicative process.163  Either leads to the 
same point: the Constitution is violated by a statute that “will implicate 
the judiciary in misrepresentation of matters of constitutional 
substance.”164 
Whether this is Klein’s true first principle, it may be its most 
enduring.  It converges somewhat with the prohibition on Congress 
predetermining rules and case outcomes, as both demand an unimpeded 
realm for independent judicial analysis and best judgment.165  But courts 
and Congress both can interpret around the latter limits by drafting and 
interpreting legislation as a permissible amendment to substantive 
law.166  By contrast, courts cannot read around this principle where 
Congress and the courts disagree on constitutional meaning.  If a law 
redefines a constitutional provision and commands courts to apply that 
 160. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2545.  See Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 
1721–22 (arguing that Klein means courts should not be forced to reach or validate incorrect or 
unconstitutional outcomes); Tyler, supra note 7, at 109 (“Congress may not compel the courts to enforce 
an unconstitutional law . . . .”). 
 161. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 4, at 443; Keith E. Whittington, Extrajdudicial Constitutional 
Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 774 (2002).  See Edward A. 
Hartnett, Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative 
Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2006) (“The central question in constitutional 
adjudication is the degree of deference, if any, that courts give to constitutional interpretation by other 
governmental actors.”); Whittington, supra, at 778 (“[T]he debate over judicial supremacy focuses more 
squarely on . . . who should make the final decision concerning contested [constitutional] 
interpretations.”).  See also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997). 
 162. See Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1269–70 (1996); Paulsen, Myth, supra note 2, at 2709; 
Whittington, supra note 161, at 781. 
 163. Sager, supra note 4, at 2533. 
 164. Id.  See Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 1721–22; Tyler, supra note 7, at 
109. 
 165. See Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 1721 (arguing that Klein prevents 
Congress from threatening courts’ autonomy and power to decide cases independently, finally, and 
effectively); supra Part III.A. 
 166. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1133; Caminker, supra note 4, at 542; Sager, supra note 4, at 
2534; supra notes 92–98, 133–155 and accompanying text. 
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definition despite judicial disagreement, Klein requires that courts 
exercise their best judgment as to the Constitution, necessarily 
disregarding any statute compelling the contrary. 
But while enduring, the principle as stated may be of relatively 
limited application.  Congress does not often enact statutes expressly 
redefining or reinterpreting the Constitution or telling courts what the 
Constitution means.  To be sure, this principle unquestionably was 
violated in Klein itself—the 1870 proviso stripped an uncontested 
presidential pardon of any effect and dictated that point to the courts.  
But it is difficult to find examples of Congress enacting a law that tells 
courts “the First Amendment shall mean X” or “the Equal Protection 
Clause is violated by Y.” 
Sager argues that a present-day Congress violated this principle with 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),167 which sought to 
override by statute a judicial interpretation of the First Amendment’s 
Free Exercise Clause.  In Employment Division v. Smith,168 the Court 
held that the Free Exercise Clause is not violated by a neutral law of 
general applicability that incidentally regulates religiously motivated 
conduct in the same way it regulates identical conduct committed for 
non-religious reasons.169  The Court rejected the argument that laws 
incidentally infringing on religiously motivated conduct should be 
subject to strict scrutiny,170 which would have forbidden incidental 
regulation of religiously motivated conduct unless the regulation was the 
least restrictive means to serve a compelling government interest.171  
RFRA was an express congressional reaction to Smith.172  It provided 
that any state or federal law that “substantially burdened” religious 
activity, even incidentally, must satisfy strict scrutiny as the least 
restrictive means to serve a compelling interest.173  Congress made 
unquestionably clear that it believed Smith had been wrong and that it 
was seeking to legislatively undo that constitutional decision. 
Sager insists this violates Klein. In applying RFRA, courts would 
conduct a familiar constitutional analysis—determining whether a 
plaintiff’s religiously motivated conduct was substantially burdened, 
then applying “exquisitely constitutional” compelling-interest 
 167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006). 
 168. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 169. Id. at 878–79.  See also Sager, supra note 4, at 2532. 
 170. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–84.  This contrasts with laws that only target religiously motivated 
conduct.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993). 
 171. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–88. 
 172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a), (b) (2006). 
 173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b) (2006); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997); 
Sager, supra note 4, at 2532. 
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analysis.174  But this is not the analysis a court, left to its independent 
First Amendment judgment and following Smith, would have applied; 
the statute compelled the court to speak an untruth as to the appropriate 
constitutional standard for evaluating the religion-burdening law.175  
And it likely pushed courts to different outcomes because strict scrutiny 
obviously invalidates many laws that survive less rigorous review. 
RFRA should not be invalid under the no-constitutional-untruths 
principle, however.  The statute did not tell courts what the First 
Amendment means or how it should apply; it did not say “X violates the 
First Amendment” or “the First Amendment shall mean X.”  Instead, 
RFRA created a new, distinct statutory right to be asserted in lieu of or 
supplemental to a First Amendment claim that would be governed by 
Smith.176  Congress frequently legislates against a constitutional 
background, creating statutory rights and duties different from existing 
constitutional rights and duties, intended to be either complementary or 
exclusive of constitutional rights regarding the same conduct.177  True, 
RFRA adopted a now-defunct constitutional standard that the Court did 
not view as the best understanding of the First Amendment.178  But, as 
Daniel Meltzer correctly argues, any statutory rule of decision must 
come from somewhere and it arguably is better for Congress to borrow 
an outdated constitutional standard than to blindly use whatever standard 
lobbyists create.179  Congress may adopt a statutory standard different 
than the constitutional standard so long as the underlying rule is within 
Congress’ legislative power.180  Whatever the merits of no-
constitutional-untruths as Klein’s first principle, RFRA did not compel 
courts to support and regularize a constitutional standard that ran against 
their independent judgment as to proper resolution of a claim for relief 
under the Constitution itself; it only required courts to apply a statutory 
standard that was different than the controlling constitutional standard.  
Whatever the validity of RFRA as a matter of congressional power, that 
constitutional issue has nothing to do with Klein.181 
 174. Sager, supra note 4, at 2532. 
 175. Id. at 2533.  See also Tyler, supra note 7, at 109. 
 176. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2545. 
 177. Id. at 2545–46.  See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2009). 
 178. Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2543–44. 
 179. Id. at 2544. 
 180. Id. at 2546. 
 181. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court unanimously struck down RFRA 
as to a local ordinance, although for a non-Klein reason.  The Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress’ 
power under § 5 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, including incorporated Bill of Rights provisions.  
Id. at 536.  The power to “enforce” meant Congress only could create statutory rights that were 
“congruent and proportional” to rights established under the Constitution, with the Court wielding sole 
power to determine the scope of the Constitution.  Id. at 530–31.  See also Sager, supra note 4, at 2532.  
WASSERMAN FINAL FORMAT 2 2/11/2011  3:43:02 PM 
80 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
So what might violate the no-constitutional-untruths principle, if not 
RFRA?  Consider recently threatened, but never enacted, legislation 
prohibiting federal courts from using foreign or international law in 
interpreting and applying the Constitution.182  Such a prohibition 
operates one step removed from Sager’s core principle—rather than 
dictating the appropriate constitutional standard, Congress dictates the 
legal sources and ideas that courts use in identifying, defining, and 
applying the appropriate constitutional standard.  But the effect is the 
same.  By limiting the sources to which courts might turn in elucidating 
constitutional ideas and meaning—sources to which judges might be 
inclined to turn if left to their best independent constitutional 
judgment—the prohibition necessarily compels courts to understand the 
Constitution in a way different than the judge deems appropriate and to 
announce that different understanding as a constitutional rule. 
But we should not read this one example as indicating real practical 
vigor.  Congress never has come close to enacting this or any similar 
bill, so the force of this “first principle” of Klein remains hypothetical.  
In fact, enactment is highly unlikely, given that the strongest judicial 
opponent of the use of foreign and international law in U.S. 
constitutional interpretation is also the strongest judicial proponent of 
the Klein argument against such efforts: Justice Scalia.  Scalia has 
criticized the practice of using foreign law in several dissents183 and in 
RFRA’s statutory rule of strict scrutiny went too far beyond Smith’s constitutional rule of, essentially, 
rational basis review.  Flores, 521 U.S. at 531. 
  On first glance, this looks similar to Sager’s no-constitutional-untruth principle, and Amanda 
Tyler argues that the analysis in Boerne “echoed” Klein.  Tyler, supra note 7, at 107.  But Klein and 
Boerne target different concerns.  Boerne does not suggest that any statutory right utilizing a standard 
different than the current constitutional rule is always invalid.  The problem with RFRA arose from 
unique limits on the scope of statutory rights that Congress can create acting under § 5 as a particular 
power grant.  But acting under a different, less-limited source of prescriptive jurisdiction, Congress 
remains free to adopt different statutory standards—even standards the courts have rejected for 
constitutional rules.  For example, lower courts have upheld RFRA as a valid limitation on otherwise-
neutral federal enactments, enacted under Congress’ Article I powers rather than under § 5, that 
substantially burden religion.  See, e.g., Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 677–78 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(stating that RFRA offers protection from religion-neutral federal laws); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 
860–61 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that RFRA is constitutional as applied to federal bankruptcy law). 
 182. See, e.g., Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, S. 520, 109th Cong. § 201 (as introduced in 
the Senate).  The proposal was motivated by several decisions in which the Court looked to principles of 
international law and the law of other nations in defining constitutional meaning.  See, e.g., Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (death penalty for juveniles); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
560 (2003) (criminalization of same-sex sodomy); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) 
(citing to foreign nations views of executing mentally handicapped). 
 183. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic premise of the Court’s 
argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the world—ought to be rejected 
out of hand.”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (labeling citation to foreign law 
“dangerous dicta”). 
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public debates with Justice Breyer.184  But Scalia insists that the sources 
of law that federal judges use in making constitutional decisions are 
none of Congress’ business: “No one is more opposed to the use of 
foreign law than I am, but I’m darned if I think it’s up to Congress to 
direct the court how to make its decisions.”185  This is a Klein no-
untruths argument.  And it seems unlikely that even a strongly 
Republican Congress would enact that prohibition in the face of vocal 
objections from a well-regarded conservative Justice. 
The no-untruths principle also creates gaps between constitutional 
rules and sub-constitutional rules.186  It limits congressional power to 
define for courts the meaning and interpretation of constitutional 
provisions and it prohibits congressional efforts to limit courts’ 
interpretive authority on matters of “constitutional substance.”187  
Congress cannot tell courts what the pardon power means or what the 
Free Exercise Clause means, nor can Congress dictate the appropriate 
standard of review or methods and sources of constitutional analysis. 
Congress, however, remains master of the meaning of statutes and 
statutory legal rules.188  There is no such thing as Congress compelling a 
court to speak a “statutory untruth”—no such thing as limiting or 
controlling judicial interpretive authority or independent judgment on 
matters of statutory substance.  The “truth” of the statutory rule, and 
what the court always is bound to wield its independent judgment to find 
and apply, is whatever Congress deems the truth. 
Congress wields potentially broad discretion in determining statutory 
truth.189  Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz argues that Congress can define 
and dictate to courts everything about statutory meaning, including how 
 184. See Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Debate, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court 
Decisions (Jan. 13. 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts. 
 185. Charles Lane, Scalia Tells Congress to Mind its Own Business, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2006, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/18/ 
AR2006051801961.html. 
 186. See Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2549 (emphasizing the “importance and transparency of a 
formal distinction between statutory prescription and purported constitutional revision”); Redish, supra 
note 118, at 715 (arguing that the purported limits on congressional authority fall away with respect to 
congressional control over sub-constitutional rules). 
 187. Sager, supra note 4, at 2533. 
 188. Brudney, supra note 132, at 33–34; Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Non-
Extant Rights, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 227, 243, 270 (2008); Widiss, supra note 130, at 518.  See W. Va. 
Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In the domain of statutory 
interpretation, Congress is the master.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 
102-166, § 113, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)). 
 189. Tyler, supra note 7, at 106.  See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default 
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2041 (2002) (“[T]he whole reason for having a political process for 
enacting statutes is to determine what the ‘right’ thing is by assuring that, within constitutional bounds, 
political preferences are reflected in statutory results.”). 
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a statute should be understood and how it should be applied in reaching 
decisions; this includes definitions of terms,190 legal standards, 
interpretive instructions, interpretive and constructive rules, permissible 
sources of legislative history and interpretive guidance, and even 
interpretive methodology.191  Courts in statutory cases are bound to 
respect Congress’ lawmaking supremacy, regardless of how Congress 
chooses to exercise and express that authority.192  On this view, 
Congress could prevent courts from looking to foreign and international 
law as guides in interpreting a statutory rule. 
Bill Araiza and Linda Jellum both agree that Congress can establish 
statutory rules, standards, and even definitions.193  But both distinguish 
drafting statutes from interpreting statutes, arguing that Congress crosses 
a separation of powers barrier when it ventures into the latter by 
commanding courts how to interpret the language that Congress has 
written and defined.194  Both commentators presumably would reject a 
rule prohibiting courts from using foreign and international law in 
interpreting federal statutes. 
But it is not clear what is sacred about statutory interpretation, as 
opposed to statutory drafting.  Both are “inescapably a kind of 
legislation,” ways to identify statutory rules of decision.195  
Identification, elaboration, and construction of those rules is a joint 
venture between Congress and the courts.  Congress has final say as to 
the best way to express the meaning of the legal rule it creates in the 
legislation itself.  Sometimes specific definitions of each term and 
provision will be possible.196  Other times, given the inherent limits of 
language, Congress may find it more effective or feasible to write in 
broad strokes and dictate the manner in which courts interpret and 
understand those strokes, such as rules about interpretive methodology 
or permissible sources of authority, a more flexible, open-ended way to 
create statutory rules as part of a broader, cohesive, coherent statutory 
 190. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
2085, 2127 (2002). 
 191. Id. at 2108, 2140, 2152.  See Elhauge, supra note 189, at 2040–41 (“[T]he legislature can 
also try to reestablish the supremacy of democratic choice by enacting statutes that specify statutory 
default rules that maximize political satisfaction.”). 
 192. Brudney, supra note 132, at 23. 
 193. See Araiza, supra note 14, at 1131; Linda D. Jellum, “Which is to Be the Master,” the 
Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation of Powers, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 837, 880, 882 (2009); see also Rosenkranz, supra note 190, at 2127 (“[D]efining terms is, in the 
first instance, an inherent incident of the legislative power.”). 
 194. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1120, 1127; Jellum, supra note 193, at 882–83. 
 195. Widiss, supra note 130, at 519. 
 196. See Rosenkranz, supra note 190, at 2142; see also Brudney, supra note 132, at 23. 
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regime.197 
Moreover, Congress unquestionably can trump judicial interpretations 
of statutes through overriding legislation—new or amended statutes 
superseding judicial interpretations of statutory language where the 
legislature disagrees with the judiciary’s understanding.198  There is no 
reason Congress cannot statutorily direct courts as to the proper 
interpretation of its legal rules in the original statute, rather than waiting 
for courts to get it wrong (in Congress’ view) and having to go back and 
enact new legislation to correct that erroneous interpretation.199 
What is uniquely judicial is not interpretation but application.  Courts 
alone wield power to take a statutory rule as written and interpreted by 
all possible interpreters and apply it to a particular set of facts and 
circumstances to resolve a specific dispute between specific parties.  
Within constitutional bounds, Congress has free reign to define those 
sub-constitutional legal rules, including the means of identifying them.  
What Congress cannot dictate is the application of those sub-
constitutional legal rules to those particular facts or the outcome of the 
case on those facts; that must remain within the courts’ independent 
judgment. 
But this simply collapses the no-untruths principle into the earlier 
Klein prohibition on legislative dictation of case outcomes, at least 
where statutory or sub-constitutional rules are concerned.200  Congress 
retains power and discretion to establish the statutory rule and the 
methods for divining that rule.  Courts merely must have free reign to 
apply the rule and resolve the legal and factual dispute as to the parties 
before them. 
C. Dictating Unconstitutional Rules of Decision 
Edward Hartnett suggests a very different, but arguably more straight-
 197. Rosenkranz, supra note 190, at 2143 (arguing that congressionally adopted interpretive rules 
could form a true interpretive regime, a set of background principles with internal coherence). 
 198. See John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1020 (2002); Widiss, supra note 130, at 
520. 
 199. Recognizing broad legislative freedom to control all manner of statutory interpretation at the 
outset avoids three problems in the statutory creation and interpretation dance between legislature and 
judiciary.  The first problem is figuring out when an amendment is an improper interpretation.  See 
Araiza, supra note 14, at 1127.  Second, courts often continue to follow statutory precedent even in the 
face of new, overriding legislation.  See Widiss, supra note 130, at 515.  Finally, Congress does not and 
realistically cannot review most of the body of statutory decisions or take steps to override those with 
which its current members disagree.  See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 198, at 974 n.25; Amanda L. 
Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1389, 1409–10 (2005). 
 200. See supra Part III.A. 
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forward, constitutional principle that emerges from the overall context of 
Klein, if not from the convoluted language of the opinion itself.  
According to Hartnett, it is not that Congress lacks authority to prescribe 
rules of decision,201 only that Congress lacks authority to prescribe 
“arbitrary” rules of decision.202  In other words, Congress cannot 
prescribe unconstitutional rules of decision—rules that violate 
constitutional rights.  The problem with the 1870 proviso, at least as 
applied in Klein, was that Wilson had received and accepted his pardon; 
certain rights vested the moment he received it and he could not be 
stripped of those rights.203 
On this view, neither of the explicit independent holdings in Klein or 
the principles derived from them are truly central.  For example, a law 
establishing a new rule of decision applicable to a pending case would 
not have raised constitutional problems so long as it did not strip vested 
constitutional rights.  Hartnett imagines that congressional preferences 
in 1870 ran the other way—that while Klein was pending on appeal, 
Congress enacted a statute overturning the Padelford rule that serving as 
a Confederate surety was an act of disloyalty, such that all those who 
had acted as sureties could recover proceeds under the 1863 Act.204  
Wilson’s estate would have been entitled to recover proceeds, regardless 
of the content or status of the pardon, because Wilson must be found 
loyal-in-fact as he never gave aid and comfort.  Such a law would have 
established a rule of decision in a pending cause, but it would not strip 
any individual vested constitutional rights, making it likely to survive 
constitutional scrutiny. 
Klein becomes not about a pending/non-pending distinction, but about 
altering the effect of the pardon after the pardon had been accepted and 
the rights vested.  The 1870 proviso would have been invalid even in 
cases brought after its enactment; regardless of timing, it still would 
have made acceptance of the pardon proof of guilt, undoing the pardon’s 
effect and stripping vested rights emanating from it.  Klein becomes not 
a separation of powers case, but an individual rights case.  And it 
becomes more than a pardon case.205  That Wilson’s vested rights came 
from a pardon was mere fortuity; the outcome would be the same if a 
 201. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 578; supra notes 69–73, 85–98 and accompanying text. 
 202. Hartnett, supra note 4, at 579; United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
 203. Hartnett argues that the concept of vested rights was a dominant feature of 19th century 
general constitutional law, which recognized limits on any laws or legal rules that stripped rights once 
they had vested with the rights-holder.  Under then-existing constitutional understandings, vested rights 
became constitutionally protected against congressional infringement.  Hartnett, supra note 4, at 579–80. 
 204. Id. at 579. 
 205. Tyler, supra note 7, at 107 (arguing that it is a mistake to under-read Klein as speaking 
exclusively to the pardon power). 
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law interfered with any vested rights emanating from any constitutional 
source. 
But this reading nevertheless renders Klein unexceptional and 
undeserving of its cult status.  For one thing, the concept of vested rights 
no longer forms a prominent part of modern constitutional analysis, 
leaving the case without much current force.  For another, to the extent 
Klein becomes about basic constitutionalism, it is well-established that 
the Constitution imposes internal and external limits on the statutory 
rules Congress can enact.  It is well-established that courts cannot 
enforce statutes that exceed Congress’ power.206  It is also well-
established that a legal rule that infringes on constitutional rights does 
not exist as enforceable law; the rights such a rule creates and duties it 
imposes do not exist and cannot be enforced or vindicated.207  Klein 
does no more than Marbury and dozens of cases in which the Court has 
struck down substantive federal statutory law as violating individual 
constitutional rights.208  We do not need Klein and it adds nothing 
meaningful to the judicial canon. 
D. Concluding Thoughts 
This Part reveals the full folly of the connected myths of Klein.  Klein 
has core meanings.  Congress cannot tell courts how to decide particular 
legal and factual issues or the outcome to reach in specific litigation.  
Congress cannot tell courts how to understand, interpret, and apply the 
Constitution or compel them to pronounce a “constitutional untruth,” a 
constitutional view with which the court disagrees.  And Congress 
cannot enact a law that violates individual rights. 
But, as shown, none of these principles is groundbreaking or 
exceptional.  Nor do any carry significant doctrinal force.  Congress 
never has enacted, nor is it likely to enact, laws that genuinely violate 
these principles.  Klein’s myth in the first sense of falsehood is exposed.  
Its myth in the second sense, of a culturally beneficial falsehood, 
becomes both unwarranted and unnecessary. 
 206. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Tyler, supra note 7, at 109 
(“Congress may not compel the courts to enforce an unconstitutional law.”). 
 207. See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Consitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial 
Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1120, 1155 (2003); Wasserman, supra note 188, at 253–54. 
 208. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001); Dickerson v. United States, 530 
U.S. 428 (2000); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1995). 
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IV. THE PATHOLOGY OF KLEIN AND THE MEANING OF MYTH 
Constitutionalism, Vincent Blasi argues, “derives from a view 
regarding the various objectives that are served by constraining 
representative institutions by means of the device of constitutional 
limitations.”209  Constitutionalism depends “on the existence of a 
considerable measure of continuity and stability regarding the most 
basic structural arrangements and value commitments of the 
constitutional regime.”210  Constitutionalism is essential in what Blasi 
calls a pathological period, one reflecting “an unusually serious 
challenge to one or more of the central norms of the constitutional 
regime.”211  Such a period is marked by a “sense of urgency stemming 
from societal disorientation if not panic.”212  Its defining feature is “a 
shift in basic attitudes, among certain influential actors if not the public 
at large,” about central constitutional commitments.213  That panic 
affects structural features and arrangements, such as formal and informal 
separation of powers and checks and balances.214  Constitutionalism and 
judicial review exist precisely to respond to and enable the system to 
survive these pathological periods.215 
Reconstruction qualifies as a pathological period under Blasi’s 
conception, particularly the politically tumultuous period from 1869 to 
1871 that produced Padelford, the proviso, and Klein.  The Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments had been enacted, but their effect on 
congressional power and on federal–state balance remained unclear.216  
Tensions between Congress and President Andrew Johnson began as 
early as 1867 and bubbled over into Johnson’s 1868 impeachment and 
near-removal from office.217  In the meantime, Congress had statutorily 
removed the invitation (or authorization) for presidential pardon in 
confiscated-property cases.218  Padelford had outraged congressional 
Republicans, who believed the decision interfered with efforts to punish 
the cotton growers who had been essential in funding the Confederate 
 209. Blasi, supra note 27, at 453. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 456, 459 (“In pathological periods, at least some of the central norms of the 
constitutional regime are indeed scrutinized and challenged.”). 
 212. Id. at 468. 
 213. Id. at 467. 
 214. Id. at 468. 
 215. Id. at 453; see supra note 30. 
 216. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 2, supra note 55, at 100–19; 122–24; FONER, supra note 55, at 257–
58; Edwards, supra note 55, at 327–28. 
 217. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 2, supra note 55, at 18–20; FONER, supra note 55, at 333–35; 
Edwards, supra note 55, at 329–30. 
 218. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141–42 (1871); Tyler, supra note 7, at 90. 
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war effort.219  Efforts to undo Padelford, and with it the then-pending 
Court of Claims decision in Klein, were part of a broader three-way 
federal-government power struggle as to the direction of the postbellum 
nation, particularly on matters of national power and the reintegration of 
southern states and citizenry into the Union.220  In that sense, Padelford 
and Klein are two of a series of judicial decisions rejecting, narrowing, 
or otherwise interfering with the Republicans’ Reconstruction agenda.221 
Blasi’s theory is that rigorous constitutional judicial review should be 
reserved for the “worst of times,”  those periods of “increased urgency” 
when traditional checks on the political branches and the public have 
been rendered ineffective to restrain political officials and citizens, 
leaving the Constitution as the only bulwark against overreaching 
officials and citizens.222  To the extent Reconstruction was a period of 
Congress overstepping its constitutional bounds, the Klein Court did 
precisely what Blasi’s constitutionalism expects the judiciary to do—it 
invalidated the law because it recognized the need for judicial action in 
these worst of times and in light of “the reduced effectiveness of 
traditional checks.”223  The Court responded to the unique circumstances 
of Reconstruction and a visceral sense that Congress was “cooking” the 
law to achieve its desired result in a time of uniquely sharp three-way 
inter-branch conflict.224  But the Court did so with a judicial doctrine 
intended and designed for the worst of times, not for ordinary times. 
This perspective ties Klein to its historical context.225  Certainly we 
have encountered subsequent pathological periods in which “central 
norms of the constitutional regime” have been “scrutinized and 
challenged” to the same extent as during Reconstruction.226  And 
certainly Congress and the President have overstepped constitutional 
bounds—including bounds of separation of powers—since then.227  
 219. See supra notes 53–58 and accompanying text. 
 220. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 2, supra note 55, at 123, 199–200, 209; FONER, supra note 55, at 183–
84, 237–38, 250–51; Edwards, supra note 55, at 327–29. 
 221. See ACKERMAN, VOL. 1, supra note 56, at 101; FONER, supra note 55, at 529; Edwards, 
supra note 55, at 335; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Blyew v. United 
States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872). 
 222. Blasi, supra note 27, at 453, 468. 
 223. Of course, it arguably was for one of the rare times in history.  See generally Gerald N. 
Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 378–79, 383–
86 (1992). 
 224. See Bloom, Unconstitutional Courses, supra note 14, at 1720 (“Klein may now seem almost 
trifling, a relic of zealous postbellum politicking.”). 
 225. See id.; Meltzer, supra note 14, at 2549. 
 226. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 459. 
 227. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); see also Rosenberg, supra note 223, at 379 tbl.I (noting multiple periods 
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Perhaps this demonstrates the myth of Klein’s vigor—Klein simply is 
not strong enough as a judicially enforceable constitutional doctrine to 
invalidate even genuinely pathological legislation.  Thus courts have not 
seen an opportunity to wield it. 
Alternatively, the problem may not be Klein itself, but the subsequent 
watering down of Klein in modern cases, where courts have backed off 
the strict prohibition on Congress prescribing rules of decision in favor 
of recognizing the need for Congress to create and amend the 
substantive statutory legal landscape.228  The idea of “dilution” of 
constitutional principles is important to the pathological perspective on 
Klein.  Blasi specifically warns against overuse of constitutional rules in 
normal times, fearing that regular use dilutes constitutional principles 
and doctrines, leaving them narrow, weak, and unavailable when truly 
pathological legislation arises and the principles are needed.229  This 
might explain Plaut, Robertson, Save Our Mall, and other recent cases 
rejecting Klein arguments against fairly ordinary, non-pathological 
legislation enacted in fairly normal times.230  The problem, Blasi might 
argue, is that those cases weakened the constitutional rule by rejecting 
these challenges, leaving a non-vigorous Klein that will be less available 
if a genuinely pathological period returns to produce genuinely 
pathological legislation. 
At the same time, recent history shows that the extreme laws that 
would violate Klein—“in A v. B pending in the District Court, B shall 
prevail,” “the federal courts shall understand the First Amendment to 
mean X,”231 or “federal courts may not consider or cite foreign and 
international law in interpreting the Constitution”232—never are or come 
close to being enacted. 
It is possible (although not provable) that Klein itself deters Congress 
from testing the limits of its lawmaking powers, avoiding laws that cross 
or draw too close to the line.233  In other words, Congress, presumed to 
know the state of the law,234 does not go too far because it is aware of 
Klein.  If so, perhaps we can modify the assertion that Klein does no 
of congressional attacks on independence of federal courts). 
 228. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
 229. Blasi, supra note 27, at 457, 487 (“The strength of the political community’s commitment to 
those norms is tested, and it may matter a great deal how well the central norms were nurtured in the 
periods of calm that preceded the pathology.”). 
 230. See supra notes 101–115, 122–125 and accompanying text. 
 231. As discussed previously, supra notes 167–181 and accompanying text, I do not believe 
RFRA dictated to courts the meaning of the First Amendment. 
 232. See supra note 182–200. 
 233. Cf. Gunther, supra note 31, at 911; Rosenberg, supra note 223, at 373–74. 
 234. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988). 
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meaningful constitutional work to say that, even if it does no meaningful 
judicial work in ex post judicial challenges to actual litigation, it does 
meaningful ex ante legislative and political work by controlling 
Congress’ and the President’s baser instincts and helping avoid the worst 
populist excesses.235  Congress has bought into the myth that Klein 
vigorously limits its powers and that myth guides its conduct and 
understanding of what it can, should, and will do.  And if congressional 
belief in the myth of Klein deters potential abuses of legislative power 
and checks inter-branch conflict before it occurs, the American politico-
legal community is advanced and important politico-legal objectives 
achieved—just as all myths form a significant part of our constitutional 
identity.236 
This ideal of Klein-in-Congress fits well with a fourth principle 
derivable from Klein, proposed by Redish and Pudelski: Congress 
cannot cook procedural and evidentiary rules to achieve desired 
substantive outcomes without fully changing and publicly 
acknowledging the state of substantive law.237  Representative 
democracy obligates elected representatives to make clear policy choices 
on behalf of their constituents and prohibits legislators from deceiving 
constituents about the true policies they support.  Congress cannot play a 
“legislative shell game” of purporting to leave substantive law in place, 
then eviscerating its legal and practical effect by manipulating 
procedural and evidentiary rules to defeat the operation of that law.238  
This is elusive and difficult to apply as judicial principle and it will be 
difficult to prove in a given case that the public was in fact deceived as 
to the state of the law by a particular enactment.239  Congress arguably 
got away with just such legislative deception in Robertson, when the 
Court validated functional congressional alteration of foundational 
environmental statutes without expressly and publicly amending 
them.240 
Klein thus becomes about congressional self-enforcement.  It 
strengthens representative democracy by imposing on Congress and on 
individual legislators a constitutional obligation of openness and 
 235. Blasi, supra note 27, at 453 (“The willingness of those who exercise political power to 
recognize superior constitutional authority may derive from perceptions of past commitment, 
calculations of reciprocal advantage, or loyalties born of a sense of common endeavor.”).  Of course, it 
is empirically unprovable to what extent members of Congress or Congress as a whole actively think in 
Klein terms when deciding what legislation they can or should enact. 
 236. See Pettys, supra note 1, at 993; supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
 237. Supra notes 150–152 and accompanying text. 
 238. Redish and Pudelski, supra note 4, at 440. 
 239. Id. at 458–59. 
 240. Araiza, supra note 14, at 1065–66. 
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forthrightness about the state of the law, the legal rules they enact, and 
the policies to which they have committed.  Even if Klein will not 
judicially invalidate whatever laws Congress enacts, it provides political 
and prudential reasons for Congress not to exercise the full limits of its 
powers, especially when the exercise of power may infringe on the 
judicial domain.241  Congress preemptively avoids potential Klein 
controversies by not enacting odd-looking, judiciary-intruding or 
judiciary-limiting laws that might draw objections, even if those 
objections would prove ultimately meritless in court. 
Of course, the essential characteristic of a truly pathological period is 
that internal constraints fall away and legislative self-enforcement will 
be insufficient, necessitating strong judicial enforcement of meaningful 
constitutional limitations.242 
The pathological perspective on Klein is important to understanding 
the case’s continued vitality because we arguably find ourselves in a 
new pathological period, triggered by the terrorist attacks of September 
11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror.  The period has been 
defined by two foreign wars, ongoing efforts against terrorism, and a 
host of controversial domestic and foreign measures by the federal 
government, especially the executive, on matters related to terrorism and 
national security. 
Our current historical period exemplifies Blasi’s conception of a 
period of “unusually serious challenge to one or more of the central 
norms of the constitutional regime.”243  We have seen a significant 
shock to, and arguably a breakdown of, structural and individual rights 
features of the constitutional and political system.244  President George 
 241. Michael J. Gerhardt, What’s Old is New Again, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1267, 1280 (2006) 
(describing the congressional “constitutional norm against legislation that would directly interfere with 
judicial decisions or decision making”); Gunther, supra note 31, at 911 (arguing that the consequences 
“have no doubt helped inhibit Congress from resorting” to its full powers); Rosenkranz, supra note 190, 
at 2147 (arguing that congressional hesitancy in controlling all aspects of legislative meaning “may stem 
from an inchoate concern about separation of powers”).  See also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural 
Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1585973) (arguing that this hesitancy is a result not only of legislative 
prudence, but of structural protections built into the Article I lawmaking process that enable minorities 
to block legislation that infringes on federal jurisdiction). 
 242. See Blasi, supra note 27, at 453 (“[U]nless the appeal to constitutionalism evokes genuine 
sentiments of long-term commitment or aspiration, officials and citizens cannot be expected to forego 
their preferences of the moment in deference to the claims of the constitutional regime.”). 
 243. Id. at 459. 
 244. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 114–15 (2007); ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN 
JUSTICE 4, 137–39 (2008); JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 52 (2008); Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless 
Wiretapping, FISA Reform, and the Lessons of Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes’s Jorde Lecture, 
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W. Bush claimed broad executive powers to act in the interest of 
national security, often to the exclusion of Congress and the courts.245  
There has been a renewed three-way dance among the branches to assert 
power for themselves and to limit or eliminate the power of the other 
branches, particularly the courts.246  At issue in all of this was the 
government’s fundamental approach to an existential crisis and the 
balance between security and individual liberty.  This dynamic is 
remarkably similar to the one during Reconstruction that produced the 
1870 proviso and Klein.  If there is a pathological historical period likely 
to produce genuinely Klein-violative legislation, this is it.  And if Klein 
is ever to exert meaningful judicial doctrinal force, it would be in these 
worst of times. 
Yet consider one significant piece of War on Terror legislation—the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 
2008.247  Sometime after the 9/11 attacks, the Bush Administration 
established a classified intelligence-gathering program to wiretap 
overseas calls to and from U.S. residents, without a warrant and outside 
procedures established in FISA.248  All but one major 
telecommunications company, Qwest, assisted the NSA with the 
program.  Cooperating companies allowed the government to install 
surveillance equipment in their calling stations, agreed to route overseas 
calls through domestic switching stations, and helped the NSA pour 
through the vast communications flowing between the United States and 
countries in the Middle East.249  After sitting on the story for 
approximately a year, The New York Times reported it in late 2005.250  
97 CAL. L. REV. 407, 412–13 (2009); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 
2d 949, 955 (N.D. Cal. 2009); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (rejecting limitations 
on habeas corpus for enemy combatants); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(permitting claim by detainee against government lawyer who promulgated detention and interrogation 
policies leading to alleged constitutional violations). 
 245. GOLDSMITH, supra note 244, at 124; LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 7–9; MAYER, supra note 
244, at 49–51; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 423–26.  See also GOLDSMITH, supra note 244, at 123 
(describing Bush Administration’s “go-it-alone route”). 
 246. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 244, at 123, 205–07 (discussing consequences of Bush 
Administration’s decision to pursue anti-terrorism policies unilaterally); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The 
Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1839, 1847 (2009) [herinafter 
Paulsen, Constitutional Power] (arguing that Congress repudiated the Court’s understanding and 
reinstated the executive view); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the President must consult with Congress, absent an emergency); Paulsen, 
Constitutional Power, supra, at 1835.  Compare Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567 (holding that presidentially 
established military commissions for terror suspects violate federal law), with Military Commissions Act 
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, and Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008). 
 247. Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 1885a (West 2010)). 
 248. LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 9; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 412. 
 249. LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 149–50, 153–54. 
 250. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955 (N.D. Cal. 
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President Bush quickly acknowledged the existence of the program and 
defended it as necessary for national security and preventing a repeat of 
9/11.251 
Lawsuits followed against the NSA and various government agencies 
and officials, as well as against the telecom companies.252  Plaintiffs 
alleged the telecoms had conspired with the government to operate a 
surveillance program that violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition on 
unreasonable searches and seizures and the First Amendment freedom of 
speech, as well as various federal statutory provisions.253 
While defending the program, President Bush and administration 
officials also argued that warrant requirements and FISA procedures 
were outdated and ill-suited to the threats of modern terrorism and that 
the wiretap program was necessary to prevent new terrorist attacks.254  
The administration also sought to codify the program already pursued, 
broadening executive surveillance powers.255  As part of that 
codification, the Administration sought retroactive immunity for the 
telecoms for their role in assisting the NSA.256  The final measure 
included a retroactive grant of immunity to the telecoms from all civil 
liability for their conduct in support of any national-security-related 
program,257 along with legislative history showing that Congress 
specifically targeted the then-pending lawsuits against the telecoms.258  
Yet in June 2009, the district court handling all the telecom lawsuits 
through multi-district litigation259 upheld § 802 against a variety of 
constitutional arguments, including Klein, and dismissed the 
constitutional claims against the telecoms.260 
Once more, rigorous judicial enforcement of Klein’s principles is 
lacking even in the face of a pathological enactment.261 
2009); LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 193–94, 209–11, 212–13; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 413. 
 251. LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 212–13; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 412–13. 
 252. See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 955; Schwartz, 
supra note 244, at 413. 
 253. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 955. 
 254. LICHTBLAU, supra note 244, at 308. 
 255. Id. at 307–08; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 414–15. 
 256. Schwartz, supra note 244, at 417. 
 257. 50 U.S.C. § 1885a (Supp. II 2008); In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 
F. Supp. 2d at 956; Schwartz, supra note 244, at 417. 
 258. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 959. 
 259. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006). 
 260. See In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 955.  The case is 
pending in the Ninth Circuit as of this writing. 
 261. In the second piece in this series, I argue that the district court’s conclusion as to Klein was 
correct.  See Wasserman, supra note 13. 
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V. CONSTITUTIONALIZING POLICY PREFERENCES 
Given Klein’s lack of genuine judicial force, the question remains 
why and how the Cult of Klein developed and why it continues.  Put 
differently, why does Klein remain a myth in the second sense of a legal 
narrative, otherwise false, that is fundamental to the self-understanding 
and commitments of the politico-legal community? 
Ultimately, Klein arguments reduce to an instinctive belief in broad 
judicial supremacy and suspicion that Congress overstepped its bounds.  
The contours of Klein-centered cases often are quite similar.  Congress 
appears to have manipulated the rules governing issue in court.  
Challenged laws appear to affect the judicial function, threatening the 
vaunted, if undefined, judicial independence and rule of law.262  
Congress appears to be “cooking” legal rules to achieve certain 
outcomes in identifiable pending or anticipated cases, with laws that 
presumably disadvantage plaintiffs, particularly plaintiffs seeking to 
vindicate rights against government or against big business.  They are 
strange-looking laws, politically distasteful to many commentators. 
For example, a prohibition on foreign and international law in 
constitutional interpretation is viewed as disadvantaging rights claimants 
by narrowing the scope of U.S. constitutional rights relative to similar 
rights elsewhere, resulting in a clear political or ideological divide 
among judges and scholars.263  That has, in fact, proven true for recent 
cases.264  But it need not be true across the board; for example, using 
foreign law might produce much narrower understandings of the First 
Amendment freedom of speech, resulting in courts upholding more 
legislative limits on expression than without the use of foreign law. 
With its broad language, apparent indeterminacy, purportedly empty 
core, and historical perception as a separation-of-powers, judicial-
independence trump card, Klein has an all-things-to-all-people 
quality.265  If Klein defines a legal-political community and reflects core 
constitutional values—if Klein is a myth in the second sense of the 
word—it should to do some constitutional heavy lifting and provide a 
 262. See Caminker, supra note 4, at 542 (grounding strong Klein principle in need to “generate 
sufficient norms of independence and, frankly, essentiality, to safeguard long-term fidelity to the rule of 
law”).  But see Shugerman, supra note 118, at 979 (arguing for narrow understanding of Klein to keep 
from “turning it into a Frankenstein of judicial independence”). 
 263. See Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, Debate, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court 
Decisions (Jan. 13. 2005), available at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts. 
 264. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–76 (2005) (execution of juveniles); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (criminalization of same-sex sodomy); Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (execution of mentally handicapped). 
 265. Young, supra note 4, at 1195. 
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doctrinal tool with which courts can push back against Congress.  The 
twin myths of opacity and vigor together cause commentators and 
advocates to assert constitutional defects far more frequently than 
Klein’s principles, properly and narrowly understood, would otherwise 
suggest.  Any unwise, strange-looking, judiciary-affecting law must 
violate the Constitution. 
Klein thus becomes the ideal vehicle for constitutionalizing those 
ordinary policy preferences.  But morphing political distaste into 
unconstitutionality blurs a central distinction.266  Conflation of wisdom 
and constitutionality is quite common in disputes over the limits of 
congressional and executive authority with respect to the judiciary.  
Gerald Gunther identified the problem in an earlier academic 
controversy over a different judicial-independence fault line: 
congressional power to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear and 
resolve particular classes of constitutional cases.  Gunther argued that 
jurisdiction-stripping proposals were neither desirable as a matter of 
policy nor likely to be effective.267  But Gunther also rejected most 
constitutional arguments against jurisdiction stripping, arguing that they 
confused “what the Constitution authorizes” with “sound constitutional 
statesmanship.”268 
Much the same is at work with many Klein arguments: the laws at 
issue may be unwise, but Klein is not so broad or powerful as precedent 
to render unwise laws constitutionally defective.  Klein imposes narrow 
constitutional limits on Congress; it says nothing about what Congress 
should do with its power within those limits.  Klein cannot convert 
normative policy objections into constitutional defects. 
Consider one category of Klein-vulnerable enactment: recent 
congressional efforts to override state common law and bar certain 
mass-tort claims.  In 2005, Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA), which prohibited, and required 
dismissal of, any “qualified civil liability action,” defined as a pending 
or future action against a member of the gun industry for any relief, 
including injunctions and nuisance abatement, resulting from criminal or 
unlawful misuse of firearms by third persons.269  The law was a direct 
response to several state-law public nuisance actions by states, 
municipalities, and individuals against gun manufacturers, gun sellers, 
and gun trade associations for failing to limit the movement of firearms 
in illegal markets and into the hands of those who use firearms for 
 266. Gunther, supra note 31, at 898. 
 267. Id. at 898, 921. 
 268. Id. at 898. 
 269. Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 100-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005). 
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unlawful purposes.  That same year, the House passed the Personal 
Responsibility in Food Consumption Act (widely known as the 
“Cheeseburger Bill”), a structurally identical piece of legislation that 
would have prohibited and required dismissal of several actions by 
consumers against the fast-food industry for damages resulting from 
obesity, weight gain, and other health problems associated with fast 
food.270 
In City of New York v. Beretta,271 the Second Circuit rejected a broad 
constitutional challenge to the PLCAA, including Klein arguments.  The 
court properly focused on the no-dictating outcomes principle, then 
recognized that the PLCAA permissibly amended substantive law—it 
established a new federal legal standard to be applied in all defined civil 
actions.272  But Congress did not dictate findings or case outcomes; the 
court was left to exercise independent judgment as to whether a 
particular claim was a qualified civil action that must be dismissed.  And 
given the substantive and structural identity between the PLCAA and the 
Cheeseburger Bill, the same analysis would have prevailed had the latter 
been enacted. 
Congress obviously wanted to protect particular industries from civil 
litigation and obviously “hoped” that any such actions would be 
dismissed, which is why it changed applicable law.  But Congress 
remains free to amend substantive law in a way likely to produce desired 
outcomes, depending on the application of new law to the facts of a 
case.  Both the PLCAA and the Cheeseburger Bill altered the state of the 
law in all defined cases and dictated a new consequence—dismissal of 
the action—based on the application of new law to fact.  But the 
judiciary retained its essential role.  It remained for the court to decide, 
in the exercise of its independent judgment, whether the particular action 
meets the statutory definition making it subject to the affirmative 
defense and ripe for dismissal. 
David Kairys criticized the PLCAA273 based on a distrust of 
legislatures.  Legislatures, he argued, are at the mercy of powerful 
litigants who, given the option, ignore the litigation process and send 
lobbyists into legislative halls seeking exemption from legal rules that 
apply to everyone else and from which the less powerful cannot gain 
 270. Personal Responsibility in Food Consumption Act of 2005, H.R. 554, 109th Cong.  The 
Senate never acted on the bill. 
 271. 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 272. Id. at 395–96.  Because only sub-constitutional law was involved, Congress could not be 
understood as having attempted to dictate constitutional meaning or to declare constitutional untruths. 
 273. Kairys’s criticism would be equally applicable to the Cheeseburger Bill. 
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similar immunity.274  Both laws immunize industry from ordinary state 
tort analysis, thus both “undercut coherent and consistent rules and 
sacrifice basic fairness for the expediency of the well-connected.”275  Of 
course, in proposing and enacting the PLCAA, Congress expressed its 
own distrust—of “maverick” judges and juries sustaining these claims 
and expanding civil liability in ways never anticipated by the Framers, 
Congress, or state legislatures.276 
But this is not a constitutional argument; it is an argument that 
Congress has enacted a scheme that does not produce just legal 
outcomes in certain cases.  Kairys rejects the congressional goal of 
protecting particular industries from civil litigation.  He objects to 
legislative politics and priorities and the way powerful interests 
manipulate legislative and political processes to their benefit.  His 
argument also is a paean to the judiciary as the great leveler, more 
resistant than legislatures to the abuses of powerful interests.  It is, in 
other words, an objection sounding entirely in political and policy 
concerns.  The PLCAA establishes (what Kairys views as) sub-optimal 
legal rules.  So would the Cheeseburger Bill.  But there simply is 
nothing unconstitutional about legislative politics or about sub-optimal 
legal rules. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
At the end of the day, Klein is a venerable case and an increasingly 
common part of the constitutional conversation.  But it does little or no 
work, certainly not in non-pathological times.  However worshipful one 
wishes to be of Klein, however much one may want to be part of its cult, 
Klein exerts no meaningful doctrinal or jurisprudential force. 
Recognizing the twin myths of Klein—that the doctrine is not 
meaningless or indeterminate, but also not constitutionally vigorous—
marks a big step toward clearing up much constitutional confusion.  That 
clarity is necessary as Congress continues to consider and enact Klein-
suspect or Klein-vulnerable laws, so we can recognize that such laws 
are, in the end, neither constitutionally suspect nor constitutionally 
vulnerable. 
 274. David Kairys, Legislative Usurpation: The Early Practice and Constitutional Repudiation of 
Legislative Intervention in Adjudication, 73 UMKC L. REV. 945, 946 (2005). 
 275. Id. at 950. 
 276. 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(7). 
